Control centres management manual, Part 1
Managing an emergency animal disease response

Version 4.2, 2018

AUSVETPLAN is a series of technical response plans that describe the proposed Australian approach to an emergency animal disease incident. The documents provide guidance based on sound analysis, linking policy, strategies, implementation, coordination and emergency-management plans.

National Biosecurity Committee
The strategies and policy guidelines are for emergency situations, and are not applicable to quarantine policies for imported livestock or livestock products.

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Approved citation


Development and approval

This manual has been produced in accordance with the procedures described in the AUSVETPLAN Overview Document, and in consultation with Australian national, state and territory governments; the relevant livestock industries; nongovernment agencies; and public health authorities, where relevant.

In this manual, text placed in square brackets [xxx] indicates that that aspect of the manual remains contentious or is under development; such text is not part of the official manual. The issues will be worked on by experts and relevant text included at a future date.

DISEASE WATCH HOTLINE: 1800 675 888

The Disease Watch Hotline is a toll-free telephone number that connects callers to the relevant state or territory officer to report concerns about any potential emergency disease situation. Anyone suspecting an emergency disease outbreak should use this number to get immediate advice and assistance.
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Edition 4
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# Introduction

This Control Centres Management Manual is an integral part of the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan, or AUSVETPLAN (Edition 4.0). The manual is in two parts:

- Part 1 describes the Australian arrangements for managing a response to an emergency animal disease (EAD), and introduces the structures for managing the response; it promotes consistent but flexible frameworks for response management across all jurisdictions, and is aligned with contemporary incident management systems.
- Part 2 describes the specific functions of state and territory, and local EAD control centres and forward command posts, and their response personnel during a response.

This manual has been produced in accordance with the agreed procedures developed for drafting of AUSVETPLAN manuals, and in consultation with Australian national, state and territory governments, and the relevant industries.

This version takes into account the provisions of the Government and Livestock Industry Cost Sharing Deed In Respect of Emergency Animal Disease Responses (EADRA) \(^1\) — for example:

- obligations regarding the reporting of incidents
- approval by the National Management Group (a peak body of government chief executive officers and industry organisation presidents) of a response plan developed by the Chief Veterinary Officer of the affected state or territory, in consultation with the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases
- financial reporting requirements of lead agencies
- performance auditing of operations
- participation of industry representatives at control centres.

This manual is central to the implementation of AUSVETPLAN and therefore contains references to other AUSVETPLAN documents, including the disease strategies, operational manuals, other management manuals and related resources.

In addition, each state and territory will have specific action plans to suit its own needs.

This manual will be reviewed regularly and updated as a result of testing in exercises and workshops, or the activation of AUSVETPLAN.

In this manual, text placed in square brackets \[xxx\] indicates that that aspect of the manual remains contentious or is under development; such text is not part of the official manual. The issues will be worked on by experts and relevant text included at a future date.

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\(^1\) Information about the EADRA can be found at www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/programs/emergency-animal-disease-preparedness/ead-response-agreement
### 1.1 Structure of AUSVETPLAN

**Table 1.1  AUSVETPLAN documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document type</th>
<th>Manuals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overview document</strong></td>
<td>Background information about AUSVETPLAN rationale, development and maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disease strategies</strong></td>
<td>Individual disease and policy information for most of the diseases listed in the EADRA</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Response policy briefs</strong></td>
<td>Summary disease and policy information for each EADRA disease not covered by individual disease strategies (see above)</td>
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<td><strong>Operational manuals</strong></td>
<td>Decontamination</td>
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1.2 Nationally agreed standard operating procedures

Nationally agreed standard operating procedures (NASOPs)\(^2\) have been developed for use by jurisdictions during responses to EAD incidents and emergencies. These procedures underpin elements of AUSVETPLAN and describe in detail specific actions undertaken during a response to an incident.

2  Background

An outbreak of an emergency animal disease (EAD) places heavy demands on animal health authorities at local, state and territory, and national levels, and on livestock industries and the community. AUSVETPLAN provides coordination of the scientific, logistic and managerial resources necessary to prepare for, and respond to, an EAD.

2.1  Purpose

To meet the aim of a consistent response across all jurisdictions, this Control Centres Management Manual (CCMM):

- describes, in functional terms, the agreed Australian arrangements for managing an EAD response
- promotes consistent but flexible frameworks for EAD response management.

To achieve these objectives, management of an EAD response is aligned with contemporary emergency response management practices, particularly the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS)\(^3\) and the Biosecurity Incident Management System (BIMS).\(^4\)

2.2  Application and scope

The CCMM is intended for use in preparation for, and response to, EADs. Parts 1 and 2 of the manual are interdependent, and awareness of both should be promoted within agencies, industries and the rural community by parties to the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) (see Section 3.1.4).

2.2.1  Managing an EAD response

Part 1 of this manual provides an overview of the national arrangements for an EAD response. This includes an outline of relevant policy and legislation, together with an introduction to the EADRA and the role of the relevant livestock industries in the response.

This part of the manual describes the response structure (function and relationship of various centres), the chain of command, and the network of agencies available to support an EAD response, including the important recovery agencies. Given the community-wide impact of any EAD, it is important that all involved are aware of the support available and how it can be accessed.

Part 1 also describes the phases of an EAD response. It outlines the activities of key personnel in the initial stages of activation of an EAD response, before control centres are established.

The potential impact of an EAD on individuals, communities and Australia as a whole requires that sound administration principles are followed from the start of the response. This will require the use of:

- appropriate information technology, including geospatial systems

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\(^3\) https://www.afac.com.au/initiative/aiims
• communication systems — within control centres; and between control centres and outside agencies, industry and the community generally
• sound financial systems, as both public and industry monies must be accounted for.

2.2.2 Operational centres

Part 2 of this manual describes the purpose and functional structures (coordination and incident management, liaison, public information, planning, operations, logistics, and finance and administration) of state and territory, and local EAD control centres and forward command posts, as well as the functional tasks of their personnel during an EAD response.

The number of personnel needed to undertake the functions will depend on various factors, particularly the nature and size of the outbreak. One person may perform one function or several functions, provided that the required tasks are carried out. When demand is high, more than one person may be required to perform a particular function.

In Part 2, the public information function descriptions are taken from the Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual.5

Previous editions of AUSVETPLAN referred to state and territory disease control headquarters (SDCHQs) and local disease control centres (LDCCs). In the current edition, these terms are replaced by State Coordination Centres (SCCs) and Local Control Centres (LCCs), respectively, to improve consistency with contemporary emergency response management terms.

A brief description of each operational centre and its area of responsibility is given below. Section 3.2 gives a detailed description of these and other response elements:

• The National Coordination Centre (NCC) (see Section 3.2.3) supports a nationally consistent approach to the management of biosecurity incidents. The NCC also provides support to the activities of the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD) (see Section 3.2.2) and the National Management Group (NMG) (see Section 3.2.1), handles international communications and relations, and liaises with other Australian Government departments. The NCC is responsible for national coordination of disease control measures and trade negotiations. In the event of a major EAD control campaign, the NCC may also coordinate resources from overseas.

• Chief Veterinary Officer units (CVO units) (see Section 3.2.4) are responsible within their jurisdiction for the overall strategic direction of the response. The CVO, often in consultation with agency senior management, determines the aim of the response within their jurisdiction and may set strategic (overall) objectives to support that aim — that is, what needs to be achieved by the response operation and the desired outcome. CVO units are advised by the SCC and act as an advisory group to the CVO. They are responsible for high-level political and industry liaison, often with political leaders, ministers and industry chief executive officers. CVO units may bring forward novel concepts or ideas, and solutions to complex problems that are not dealt with at the SCC level. CVO units also support the CVO to provide effective business continuity for the CVO’s animal health responsibilities that are external to the emergency response.

• State Coordination Centres (SCCs) (see Section 3.2.5) have responsibility for strategic planning and coordination of the response to an EAD, and for ensuring that industry involvement and communications are in place. It is imperative that strategic management and operational management be kept separate. Planning at this strategic level is informed by the CVO’s strategic direction and is focused on the coordination requirements of the incident. However, the SCC maintains overall control of the incident under the CVO, and is able to give specific directions to LCCs to ensure that the CVO’s intentions are met.

Local Control Centres (LCCs) (see Section 3.2.6) are responsible for the planning and conduct of field operations in a defined geographical area, usually the restricted area (RA). Planning at this level is action planning, informed by strategic direction and focused on what is required to achieve the strategic aim. It addresses the detail of how operations will be conducted and supported for that purpose.

Forward command posts (FCPs) (see Section 3.2.7) are responsible for the conduct of field operational activities within a defined area, usually part of the RA where it is deemed operationally efficient to have an operations centre physically close to the area of operational activity. FCPs report to the Operations Management function within the relevant LCC.

Note: Operational activities within the RA are the responsibility of the LCC. Operational activities outside the RA may be managed by the SCC, the LCC or an FCP, depending on the nature of the incident. The CVO will need to clearly indicate how these activities will be managed in the jurisdiction at the commencement of the response.

Figure 2.1 shows the organisational relationships between operational centres described in AUSVETPLAN and jurisdictional executive bodies. It acknowledges that industries may have a role outside of the AUSVETPLAN response structure that will inform the EAD response.

The role of industry is integral to any EAD response. Affected industries are represented in control centres and may also have an advocacy role. This advocacy role, which is not specifically addressed in this manual, informs the response through the CVO and industry personnel in the control centres.

Figure 2.1  Organisational relationships

2.3  Agreed principles

- The CCMM is based on contemporary incident management systems. It operates within a broader emergency management environment (all-hazard arrangements) for coordinated whole-of-government and industry response to, and recovery from, an EAD.
- Lead agencies are unlikely to have all the necessary resources to respond to even a minor EAD incident. It is therefore important that links to industry, service contractors, support agencies and other emergency response agencies are maintained through training and planning activities at all levels.
- The CCMM must be adapted to local legislative and administrative requirements by each jurisdiction responsible for the management of EAD responses.
- AUSVETPLAN provides the agreed national framework; state and territory plans will need to reflect this approach in their own arrangements.
• Communication with all stakeholders, including industry and the community, must be a high priority during an EAD response.
• Media and public information units at local, state and territory, and national levels have different responsibilities and target audiences, and must network to encourage the distribution of consistent and relevant messages.\(^6\)
• EAD response operations must be resourced as quickly as possible, and resources must be matched to the response’s ongoing requirements.
• Lead agencies must collaborate with the CCEAD on technical issues and with the NMG, which is responsible for approving cost-sharing.
• All personnel participating in the incident are part of an agreed organisational structure with clear reporting lines or ‘chain of command’. Ideally, personnel report directly to, and are directed by, only one other individual. This does not prevent collaboration to benefit the response; rather, it clarifies the system for establishing and monitoring priorities. Where appropriate, there must be informal communication between colleagues in different sections and in other control centres.
• Industry and governments have a shared responsibility for biosecurity.
• Industry organisations have an important role under AUSVETPLAN and the EADRA, and are active participants in an EAD response. They help manage the response and act as conduits for information to and from industry participants and government.

### 2.4 Characteristics and considerations for an EAD response

EAD incidents differ from other emergencies in the following important characteristics.

#### 2.4.1 Timespan

The lead agency in the case of fire, flood or storm damage usually plans for a response lasting days or weeks. In contrast, an EAD response can last for months. The response to the equine influenza outbreak in Australia in 2007 took more than 6 months. This has important implications for:

- siting of control centres — use of community facilities such as sportsgrounds or community halls is not usually appropriate for long-term responses
- availability and continuity of personnel
- planning for business continuity to ensure that personnel can be seconded to an EAD response with effective backfilling of their positions (or reallocation of their day-to-day functions or priority work areas)
- policies and control measures, which are likely to vary over time, depending on the stage of the response and developments during the response, and may be influenced by scientific, industry and political drivers. This does not mean that previous policies were not effective or that control measures are failing. Rather, it recognises the need to adapt to the current situation and, particularly in the case of emerging diseases, the availability of new information. This will need to be carefully explained to the community, media, industry and response personnel.

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2.4.2 Biosecurity

Most emergency response agencies that may be involved in an EAD response have a sound understanding of the need for physical security, but do not have training in biosecurity measures. EADs may move rapidly across large distances by means of vectors, fomites, infected animals, contaminated animal products or people. Biosecurity measures typically need to be established very rapidly to limit the spread of disease. They may include restrictions on the movement of animals, products, people and vehicles, together with appropriate decontamination. If they are to succeed, early education of industries, support agencies and the community is necessary.

Response agencies must also be aware of existing biosecurity measures in place within specific industries. Where appropriate, these should be used and not contravened.

2.4.3 Variation in responses

EADs vary greatly in nature; hence, there is no response that fits all cases. Arboviral diseases (viral diseases that are spread by insects) will require different control measures from zoonoses that do not involve vectors (such as anthrax) or highly infectious diseases (such as foot-and-mouth disease — FMD). The control of an EAD may involve an appropriate combination of movement controls, treatment or destruction of affected animals, vaccination, disinsection, decontamination, treatment of animal products, control of wild (including feral) animals, disposal of infected animals and contaminated products, and monitoring for freedom from disease.

2.4.4 Extent

As explained in Section 2.4.2, EADs can spread rapidly across large distances by many means. Rapid dispersal of livestock and livestock products by road, rail, air and ship can result in more than one jurisdiction being involved simultaneously. This has implications for the impact on industries, the community, tourism and trade, and the resources required to control the disease. For some diseases, an important factor in limiting spread may be the implementation of a widespread — even national — livestock standstill.

2.4.5 Economic and social impact

An EAD outbreak will affect not only individuals, industry and the local community, but also, potentially, export trade and the Australian community in general. The direct impacts on associated industries can also be severe. The outbreak of equine influenza in 2007 affected the export of horses; it also affected horse owners, trainers, feed suppliers, veterinary practices, farriers, the racing industry (including gambling revenues to governments) and horse transporters. A recent report by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences\(^7\) estimated that a widespread FMD outbreak could cost $52 billion over 10 years. The most effective way to minimise the impact is through rapid detection of disease and implementation of effective control measures.

Relief and recovery activities are part of an EAD response. Since they are typically managed through each jurisdiction’s emergency management arrangements, these activities are outside the scope of AUSVETPLAN. They minimise community impacts, encourage community cooperation and return the situation to normal as soon as possible. Effective community engagement within the response, such as offering employment in the response effort, is also highly recommended as one measure to mitigate economic impact.

2.4.6 Public health

Many EADs are caused by zoonotic infectious agents — that is, agents that can also infect humans. This has important implications for owners of affected animals, their families and workers, communities, processing industries (abattoirs, milk factories, tanneries, etc) and those working on the response. It is important that response personnel at all levels are aware of the appropriate measures to minimise the risk to humans, and confirm that all people under their responsibility have access to, and use, appropriate workplace health and safety controls. The hierarchy of controls is:

1. eliminate the hazard
2. substitute the hazard with a hazard of lower risk
3. isolate personnel from the risk or isolate the risk from personnel
4. apply engineering controls to mitigate the risk
5. apply administrative controls
6. apply personal protective equipment.

In some cases, response personnel operating at the human–animal interface may also be required to be vaccinated for relevant diseases or take prophylactic medicines.

The appropriate safety measures should be explained to the community and industry, to avoid panic and ensure that potential workers are not dissuaded from being involved in control measures.

2.4.7 Unusual workplace considerations

Although the chemical, physical and psychological hazards encountered during an EAD response are not unique, they are likely to be experienced on an unusual scale. This requires that special consideration is given to managing the associated risks.

2.4.8 Scalability

EADs can rapidly escalate in extent, as described in Section 2.4.2 and Section 2.4.4. In the early stage of a response, information on the extent of the EAD is often incomplete. It is therefore appropriate to commence a wide-scale response (within reason for the disease and its likely impact), but be able to scale the response as more information becomes available.

Resources should be deployed commensurate with need. The ability to remain flexible to the response needs should be maintained before, during and after the response.

AllIMS provides for the concept of classification of incidents — for example, ‘the classification of an incident gives us some sense of its potential consequence and impact’ (AllIMS 4, p21) and ‘the incident drives the size and nature of the Incident Management Team’ (AllIMS 4, p13).

BIMS contextualises these concepts to biosecurity incidents. The classification (or level) of incident needs to be identified and communicated, to ensure that the appropriate level of coordination, resources and support are provided. Defined levels are:

- Level 1 — local response managed by local resources, with little or no external support

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• Level 2 — local or regional response, with some support coordinated by a state or territory agency

• Level 3 — state-wide or territory-wide response with a fully operational SCC and LCC(s), and, possibly, assistance from outside the jurisdiction

• Level 4 — one or more jurisdictions are involved in managing the response, and one or more of the involved jurisdiction’s resources or established arrangements are insufficient for the response. The NCC is required to coordinate nationally available resources

• Level 5 — one or more jurisdictions are involved in managing the response, and national resources are insufficient for the response. The NCC is required to coordinate national and international support resources.

See Section 2.6 of BIMS for examples of organisational structures that may be applicable to each incident level.
3 Managing an EAD response

3.1 National arrangements for the control of EADs

Australia has well-established national, state and territory arrangements for managing the response to an emergency animal disease (EAD). This section provides a brief overview of these arrangements and provides context for the remainder of Part 1 of the Control Centres Management Manual (CCMM).

Figure 3.1 shows the framework for policies, manuals, procedures, work instructions and forms used during a biosecurity response (across all sectors).
3.1.1 Background

National plans and agreements are to be used, as applicable, during EAD responses. Any variation to national plans and agreements is to be documented. Where a national plan does not exist for a particular response, the most relevant AUSVETPLAN Disease Strategy or Response Policy Brief will be the default plan.

Personnel operating under AUSVETPLAN and whole-of-government work arrangements will be required to operate within state and territory government plans, such as disaster management plans or EAD subplans. Emergency response personnel will need to be cognisant of any memorandums of understanding between the lead agency and other government or industry organisations.

Threat-specific or species-specific industry plans may exist (especially for the pork and poultry intensive industries) and must be consulted in the event of an EAD response.

3.1.2 General policy

Where technically feasible, approved by the National Management Group (NMG) and considered to be cost-effective, the policy for control of an EAD is stamping out. Stamping out involves:

- quarantine and/or movement controls
- destruction and disposal of infected and exposed animals
- decontamination of infected premises
- surveillance of susceptible animals
- restriction of the activities of certain enterprises.

Stamping out is primarily used for diseases that cause significant morbidity or mortality, result in production losses, pose a threat to international trade or are a public health risk — for example, African swine fever and highly pathogenic avian influenza.

These measures may be supplemented, where necessary (or replaced when stamping out is not appropriate), by one or more of:

- vaccination
- vector or wild animal control
- animal treatment.

For some diseases, stamping out is unlikely to be effective. This particularly applies to insect-borne diseases such as bluetongue.

A restricted area, transmission area (for vector-borne diseases) and control area (see glossary) may be established to contain the disease agent.

A major EAD control campaign is a complex operation requiring rapid mobilisation of resources, and coordination of a diverse team of people and other resources. The response requires input from all tiers of government, industry and support agencies, and may need to address financial, social, economic, human and animal health, trade and recovery issues.

3.1.3 Legislation

In Australia, each state and territory has statutory responsibility for the management of animal diseases — endemic, emerging or exotic — within its borders. Each state and territory therefore
administers its own EAD legislation, which is supported by other all-hazard emergency management legislation and arrangements.

Inspectors and authorised officers are appointed under the relevant jurisdictional EAD legislation, ensuring that those who are required to implement the legislation (eg movement controls, imposition of quarantine) have the legal authority to do so. All officers need a clear understanding of the legislation, as it frequently informs policy and critical decision making.

In all jurisdictions, EAD legislation provides adequate powers for essential EAD control measures. The Australian Government may support the jurisdictions with its powers under Commonwealth legislation.

3.1.4 Funding EAD responses — the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement

The Government and Livestock Industry Cost Sharing Deed in Respect of Emergency Animal Disease Responses (Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement — EADRA)\textsuperscript{10} is a legally binding agreement between the Australian Government, the state and territory governments, livestock industries and Animal Health Australia. It supports a rapid and efficient response to an EAD outbreak.

The agreement establishes basic operating principles and guidelines, and defines roles and responsibilities of the parties. It includes provisions for formal consultation and dispute resolution between government and industry on resource allocation, funding, training, risk management and ongoing biosecurity arrangements.

The signatories to the EADRA are committed to:

- minimising the risk of EAD incursions by developing and implementing biosecurity plans for their jurisdictions or industries
- maintaining capacity to respond to an EAD by having adequate numbers of trained personnel available to fill roles specified in AUSVETPLAN
- participating in decision making relating to EAD responses, through representation on the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD) and the NMG
- sharing the eligible response costs of EAD incursions using pre-agreed cost-sharing formulas.

The EADRA is regularly reviewed so that it remains relevant, flexible and functional.

3.2 EAD response structure and components

The response to any EAD incident will require the establishment of a response organisational structure, specific to the situation. This structure will have two functions:

- provision of strategic policy and direction
- planning and implementation of operational activities.

Provision of strategic policy and direction occurs at the national and state or territory levels, whereas planning and implementation of operational activities can occur at the national, state or territory, and local levels.

The response to a cost-shared EAD incident relies on established response management arrangements, which include the EADRA (see Section 3.1.4), AUSVETPLAN, the NMG (see

Section 3.2.1), the CCEAD (see Section 3.2.2) and whole-of-government emergency management arrangements. Where appropriate, it also involves the establishment of control centres to plan and manage the operational aspects of the response. These centres can be established at the national, state or territory, local and field levels.

The response to an EAD incident also relies on the involvement of industry and the respective government agency executives — including the head of the agency (chief executive officer or similar) and the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO). Together, the industry and agency executive form a vital link between their jurisdiction and the national aspects of a response.

Management of responses outside cost-sharing arrangements may be undertaken as the jurisdiction sees fit. However, it is in a jurisdiction’s best interests to manage the response in accordance with contemporary emergency management practices, should the response escalate to a level necessitating engagement of other parties (eg support agencies, recovery agencies, other jurisdictions), through agreed management frameworks and cost-sharing.

Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the relationships between national and jurisdictional agencies involved in strategic policy and decision making, and the operational planning and implementation aspects of an EAD response.\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.2.png}
\caption*{EAD response arrangements in a localised incident based in a single state or territory}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{11} The structure of animal health and welfare management committees and organisations in Australia outside of an EAD response is described in the AUSVETPLAN Overview Document.
Figure 3.3  EAD response arrangements in a major incident based in more than one state or territory

Managing the response to an EAD is underpinned by five key principles (based on the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System, 4th edition):^{12}

- The size and structure of the response framework should reflect the size and complexity of the incident, and the stage of the response and recovery (**flexibility**).
- The response is managed through setting, communicating and achieving objectives (**management by objectives**).
- A response framework is established that is based around the functions that need to be performed (**functional approach**).
- The number of people or groups being supervised by each person involved in the response is limited to a workable number (**span of control**).
- Each individual working in a response should only report to one supervisor, and there is one consolidated plan for all responders (**unity of command**).

Three of these principles (management by objectives, functional approach and span of control) are contextualised to biosecurity incidents in the Biosecurity Incident Management System.^{13}
EADs are managed through application of control, command and coordination, which are widely accepted terms and concepts in the emergency management sector. These terms are defined as follows, contextualised to an EAD response:

- **Control** refers to the overall direction of activities in an EAD response. Authority for control is established in legislation. It involves responsibility for tasking other organisations in accordance with the needs of the situation. Control operates horizontally across all agencies, functions and individuals in the area of impact.

- **Command** is the internal direction of the members and resources of an agency in the performance of the organisation’s roles and tasks, by agreement and in accordance with relevant legislation. Command operates vertically within an organisation.

- **Coordination** is the bringing together of resources, agencies and individuals to support an emergency response. It does not include the control of agencies and individuals by direction.

### 3.2.1 National Management Group

When the NMG is established, it decides whether or not cost-sharing will be approved. If cost-sharing is approved, it will be invoked following technical advice from the CCEAD on the ability to control or eradicate the disease, and the recommendation of an appropriate Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan (EADRP). The NMG manages the national policy and resourcing needs of an EADRP on behalf of the affected parties, as described in Schedule 8 of the EADRA.\(^{14}\)

The NMG is convened for the specific outbreak and also to consider general issues of EAD response management. Membership comprises:

- the Secretary of the Australian Government Department of Agriculture (DA) (chair)
- the chief executives of the state and territory government parties
- the president (or analogous officer) of each of the relevant industry parties
- Animal Health Australia, as an observer.\(^{15}\)

Under the EADRA, the NMG has specific responsibility for:

- receiving advice from the CCEAD on technical issues relating to an EAD
- receiving regular reports from the CCEAD, including reports of budgeted, committed and actual expenditure on an EADRP
- making key decisions, which may include
  - the approval of an EADRP, including an indicative budget
  - the review of an EADRP, where it believes the cost may exceed the agreed limit
  - the setting of an upper limit on expenditure from time to time, at a level less than the agreed limit, below which EADRP expenditure may be committed without reference to the NMG
  - the determination of whether a party has acted appropriately in reporting of an EAD
  - a determination that an EAD has been controlled (eradicated or contained)
  - a determination that an EAD is not capable of being controlled (ie eradicated or contained)
    - by means of an EADRP
  - the consideration of efficiency audit reports and the financial audit report
- reporting as necessary to the Australian Agriculture Ministers’ Forum, or its equivalent, concerning an EADRP.\(^{16}\)


\(^{15}\) Government and Livestock Industry Cost Sharing Deed In Respect of Emergency Animal Disease Responses, Variation 10/02 – 26/10/10, Schedule 8, Part 1

\(^{16}\) Government and Livestock Industry Cost Sharing Deed In Respect of Emergency Animal Disease Responses, Variation 10/02 – 26/10/10, Schedule 8, Part 1.1
3.2.2 Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases

When the CCEAD is established, its roles are to effectively and efficiently coordinate the national EAD response, and to advise meetings of the NMG on the response, in accordance with the EADRA.\textsuperscript{17}

The CCEAD is the key technical coordinating body providing the link between the Australian Government, the states and territories, industry, Animal Health Australia and the NMG for animal health emergencies.

The CCEAD is convened and chaired by the Australian Chief Veterinary Officer (ACVO), and consists of:

- members representing national, state and territory animal health agencies, including
  - all state and territory CVOs (or their nominees)
  - representatives of DA Biosecurity
  - representatives of the CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory
- representatives of affected and industry parties, collectively
- a representative of Animal Health Australia as an observer.

Under Schedule 8 of the EADRA, the CCEAD has specific responsibilities to:

- receive formal notifications from government parties on suspected EAD incidents
- advise the NMG if an EADRP is required
- recommend to the NMG an EADRP
- consider regular consolidated reports on the status of an EADRP to the affected parties and the NMG
- in circumstances where rapid eradication of an EAD is judged no longer feasible, provide advice and recommendations to the NMG on when the EADRP should be terminated, when cost-sharing should no longer apply and options for alternative arrangements
- determine when a disease has been contained or eradicated under an EADRP
- recommend when proof of freedom has been achieved following the successful implementation of an EADRP.

3.2.3 National Coordination Centre

The National Coordination Centre (NCC) is provided by DA as the lead Australian Government agency for the response to agricultural (including EAD) incidents.

Depending on the scale of DA’s involvement in the EAD response, the department may activate an NCC at the direction of the ACVO (who is an officer within DA). Alternatively, the department may choose to manage its responsibilities in an EAD incident without formally activating an NCC.

DA — whether through an NCC or not — manages its responsibilities in accordance with relevant international and national animal health legislation and agreements. The actions implemented by DA in response to an EAD will vary, depending on the nature of the incident. In general, DA will have responsibilities at the international and national levels.

\textsuperscript{17} Government and Livestock Industry Cost Sharing Deed In Respect of Emergency Animal Disease Responses, Variation 10/02 – 26/10/10, Schedule 8, 3.1
At an international level, DA will:

• endeavour to maintain market access by providing technical briefings and other information to trading partners and overseas posts
• trace relevant exported agricultural commodities and animals
• assist with tracing imported agricultural commodities and imported animals
• meet Australia’s international reporting obligations (e.g., to the World Organisation for Animal Health — OIE, and the World Trade Organization)
• coordinate information for, and monitor, the media (including news) and the internet
• coordinate acquisition or deployment of overseas assistance through implementation of the International Animal Health Emergency Reserve (IAHER) agreement.

At a national level, DA will:

• convene, chair and provide secretariat support to the CCEAD and the NMG
• coordinate public information; and convene, chair and support the National Communication Network
• develop and implement a national communications strategy in consultation with relevant jurisdictions
• coordinate national response strategies, and monitor state and territory activities
• provide strategic analysis for EAD control options, including their broader and longer-term implications
• provide technical policy advice and assistance to the affected state or territory on national or international issues
• develop national epidemiological models to support strategic decision making
• invoke provisions under appropriate Commonwealth legislation
• coordinate the deployment and application of established resource pools, such as the national Rapid Response Team and the Australian Veterinary Reserve
• liaise with, and coordinate, other Australian Government agencies
• prepare national situation reports and other briefing materials for DA, its executive and the minister.

Resource coordination function of the NCC

The resource coordination function of the NCC provides a coordinated approach to the management and maintenance of national and international human resources that are required during the response to an EAD incident.

For example, during a biosecurity incident, requests for human resources are received from affected jurisdictions and met from established pools of resources, as well as from other available areas, including through the IAHER agreement.

Liaison between the NCC and the State Coordination Centre

Liaison between the NCC and the State Coordination Centre (SCC) occurs in numerous ways:

• via the CCEAD and NMG
• via the CCEAD Secretariat and NMG Secretariat
• via the NCC Incident Manager directly to SCCs (possibly, in a large or prolonged emergency, through a DA jurisdictional liaison officer posted to the SCC, or a state or territory officer posted to the NCC)
• via the NCC Public Information Management function to SCC Public Information Management functions
• via the NCC Planning function to SCC Planning function, and via the NCC Logistics function to SCC Logistics function, to undertake resource coordination activities.

3.2.4 Chief Veterinary Officer unit

The specific functions performed by a Chief Veterinary Officer unit (CVO unit) are described in detail in Part 2 of the CCMM.

3.2.5 State Coordination Centre

The specific functions performed by an SCC are described in detail in Part 2 of the CCMM.

During a response to an EAD, the responsible state or territory animal health authority will manage its responsibilities in accordance with relevant national, and state or territory animal health arrangements (such as relevant legislation, the EADRA and AUSVETPLAN), and state or territory emergency management arrangements. This may include the establishment of an SCC.

The SCC will have primary responsibility for coordinating activities across the state or territory, in accordance with the strategic direction provided by the CVO, the CCEAD and the NMG. The SCC maintains overall control of the incident under the CVO and is able to give specific directions to Local Control Centres (LCCs) to ensure that the CVO’s intentions are met. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to combine SCC and LCC responsibilities into one centre. If this occurs, personnel will need to separate strategic, statewide activities from operational activities being conducted at a local or field level.

Resources provided to the SCC and LCC may be coordinated centrally to avoid one centre having preferential access to resources. The SCC will liaise with the NCC when resources are being provided from international or interjurisdictional sources, to ensure appropriate allocation and use of these resources.

Figure 3.4 shows the functional structure of the SCC.
3.2.6 Local Control Centre

The specific functions performed by an LCC are described in detail in Part 2 of the CCMM.

During a response to an EAD, the responsible state or territory animal health authority may choose to establish one or more LCCs to manage operational aspects of the response.

During a response, the CVO will assign the LCC a specific area of responsibility, and the LCC will manage operational activities within this area. The area may be limited to the restricted area (RA) or may be another defined geographical area.
The LCC will have primary responsibility for planning, conducting and supporting all operational activities in its geographic area(s) of responsibility, consistent with the strategic direction provided by the SCC.

Depending on the complexity or extent of the response, it may be necessary to establish more than one LCC. The focus of the activities of each LCC will be guided by the objectives established at the state or territory level. The LCC's Incident Management Team (IMT) will identify the objectives for the LCC, how they will be achieved and how responsibilities are allocated. These arrangements will be documented in an Incident Action Plan, which will be approved by the IMT and disseminated (in writing or verbally) to those with responsibility for implementing activities.

Figure 3.5 shows the functional structure of the LCC.

![Diagram showing the functional structure of the Local Control Centre]

Note: The dotted line in the diagram acknowledges the close relationship between the Logistics and Finance and Administration functions of the LCC. It shows that, if these functions are integrated, the Logistics Management function has overall responsibility for their outputs and represents them both at the IMT.

**Figure 3.5   Functional structure of the Local Control Centre**
Field activities may be managed from the LCC. Alternatively, depending on the scale and complexity of the response, one or more Forward Command Posts (FCPs) may be established. Figure 3.6 shows the reporting relationships between the LCC and field functions (which are described in Part 2 of the CCMM).

**Figure 3.6 Organisational structure of the LCC Field function**

### 3.2.7 Forward Command Post

The specific functions performed by an FCP are described in detail in Part 2 of the CCMM.

During a response to an EAD, the responsible state or territory animal health authority may choose to establish one or more FCPs. The FCPs will manage field activities within a defined geographical area, with a focus on achieving an identified task or range of tasks. FCPs are usually established where it is impractical for field personnel to work from an LCC because of the remoteness of the incident.

The FCP may be established to:
- manage field activities associated with a number of premises in a small or well-defined geographical area, remote from the LCC
- act as an assembly point for activities associated with remotely located premises
• manage specific operational tasks that need to be undertaken within the defined area, such as vaccination, vector control and aerial spraying.

The FCP will report directly to the Operations Management function in the LCC. Because of biosecurity concerns, it is preferable that the FCP not be the point of contact for the local community. Instead, a separate community engagement centre should be established, where possible.

Note: Operational activities within the RA are the responsibility of the LCC. Operational activities outside the RA may be managed by the SCC, the LCC or an FCP, depending on the nature of the incident. The CVO will need to clearly indicate how these activities will be managed in the jurisdiction at the commencement of the response.

### 3.2.8 Control centre functions

The SCC and LCC functions are performed by seven functional groups. The managers of these functions at the SCC form the Coordination Management Team (CMT), through which the SCC Coordinator manages the SCC activities. The managers of these functions at the LCC form the Incident Management Team (IMT), through which the LCC Controller manages the LCC activities. The functions are as follows:

- **Coordination/Incident Management and Control** — provides overall management of the activities associated with the centre’s role. The person with this responsibility is referred to as SCC Coordinator at SCC level and LCC Controller at LCC level.
- **Liaison** — manages the interaction between external agencies and the centre. Typical groups for liaison are:
  - affected livestock industries
  - veterinary practitioners
  - jurisdictional departments for biosecurity and agriculture
  - other agencies or organisations (eg for recovery, support)
- **Public Information** — manages public information and perceptions via the interface between the public and media.
- **Planning** — manages the collection, analysis and dissemination of information, in the form of written plans and reports. Planning is responsible for providing the CMT or IMT with operational objectives and resource projections for the various timelines required by the response strategy set by the CVO.
- **Operations** — manages the tasking and application of resources to achieve the operational objectives set by the CMT or IMT.
- **Logistics** — manages the acquisition and provision of human and physical resources, facilities, services and materials that are required to achieve the operational objectives set by the CMT or IMT.
- **Finance and Administration** — manages the finance, procurement processes, records and information flow within a centre.

Representatives of agencies and organisations are nominated by their respective body and should have the authority to provide advice and resources.

Depending on the size and complexity of the response, one person may perform several functions, or one function may be performed by multiple personnel.
3.2.9 Affected livestock industries

Affected livestock industries have a key role in providing input to the management of EAD responses. When cost-sharing is invoked under the EADRA, industries integrate at the NMG, CCEAD, CVO, SCC and LCC levels. At all levels, they have a responsibility to:

- liaise between industry, and the state or territory animal health authority
- ensure that industry concerns are raised, acknowledged and addressed
- make decisions on behalf of industry (commensurate with their authority)
- participate in strategic decision making
- communicate decision outcomes regarding strategy, policy and procedure to appropriate industry members.

The president (or analogous officer) of each of the affected industry parties will participate in the NMG for cost-shared responses. The representative will consider, from an industry perspective, policy and financial issues associated with the response, and provide input into key decision making regarding the implementation of the EADRP.

Industry representatives on the CCEAD will make recommendations about the technical feasibility of proposed EADRPs. They apply industry-specific knowledge in their assessment of the EADRP and, with other CCEAD members, are responsible for recommending the EADRP to the NMG, reviewing progress of the EADRP, and determining when a disease has been adequately controlled (ie contained or eradicated) under the EADRP.

Industry liaison personnel at the SCC and LCC levels are appointed by, and responsible to, their industry. Ideally, they will be employed under the employment conditions of their industry. Industry will need to consider providing liability insurance for these personnel. They work at the SCC and LCC in the Liaison — Livestock Industry function to:

- assist with disease risk assessment and provide comprehensive advice at the state, territory or local level (as appropriate) on the industry affected; this includes details of the industry’s size, distribution, sources of supply, marketing practices, industry organisations, personnel and other factors that may affect the EAD response
- advise SCC and/or LCC personnel on practical, economic and other consequences of proposed disease control measures
- advise on resources and services that may be available from industry to support the response
- provide and facilitate constructive, two-way communications between industry and the SCC or LCC about disease control measures, the response progress and their industry.

Personnel undertaking the Liaison — Livestock Industry function should have the authority to act on behalf of their organisation at the appropriate level. If they do not have this authority, they must be able to obtain it quickly.

Individuals from affected industries can also be employed by a jurisdiction to work in numerous functions in the SCC or LCC (particularly in the Planning and Operations sections), or in Field functions. The Planning function Specialist Advice — Livestock Industry is tailored for personnel with industry-specific insight and skill, so that their knowledge may contribute to the development of all response plans.

3.2.10 Other supporting agencies

Jurisdictional emergency and disaster management arrangements are based on partnerships involving a wide range of agencies and organisations that provide assistance to a lead agency during
an incident. These include governments (all levels), government-owned corporations, nongovernment organisations, the not-for-profit sector, commercial and industry sectors, and the local community (individuals and existing or new groups). When coordinated effectively, these partnerships and arrangements allow a more effective EAD response. Support services for the lead agency can include:

- animal care support (eg from veterinary practitioners, RSPCA, wildlife care organisations)
- support from interstate animal health jurisdictional authorities (especially when the EAD response crosses state or territory borders)
- jurisdiction-based support (eg engineering services, physical and human resources, human health services, public information services, transport services)
- disaster recovery for psychosocial, economic, environmental and infrastructure elements.

These responsibilities and arrangements are described in each state’s or territory’s emergency management arrangements, which may include subplans for supporting services.

In practice, they are maintained through the state or territory all-hazard committee structures, which usually operate at local, district or regional, and state or territory levels. Local committees are usually managed by the relevant local government council, and district or regional committees are usually managed by the senior police officer in the area.

Lead agencies should engage with support agencies as early as possible to access necessary services and resources. This may mean appointing dedicated officer(s) from the SCC or LCC to liaise with the relevant state or territory all-hazard committees, and/or requesting personnel from these committees to undertake liaison functions at the SCC or LCC.

### 3.2.11 Recovery agencies

Although recovery activities are outside the scope of the EADRA and AUSVETPLAN, all levels of government have responsibilities to provide for emergency and disaster recovery, which encompasses four nationally recognised ‘pillars’:

- psychosocial (people/community aspect)
- economic
- environment
- infrastructure.

A wide range of supporting agencies may be involved in emergency and disaster recovery, and may seek information from the SCC or LCC on matters such as:

- the number of properties, areas and families directly affected (and requiring crisis counselling, personal support and/or individual financial assistance)
- supply-chain impacts of the disease and response (eg on other businesses; sectors, such as tourism; geographic areas)
- consequences relevant to the four pillars that are likely to flow from the disease control measures
- anticipated needs of affected communities while the response is under way and after it is concluded.

In each state or territory, the relevant agencies are often active following natural hazard events. They are coordinated through the state or territory all-hazard committee structures. Lead agencies for EAD responses should engage with them as soon as possible to optimise recovery for the entire community, including affected industries. This may mean appointing dedicated officer(s) from the
SCC or LCC to liaise with the relevant state or territory all-hazard committees, and/or requesting personnel from these committees to undertake recovery liaison functions at the SCC or LCC.
4 Phases of response

A response has four phases: investigation and alert, operational, proof of freedom and stand-down. These phases are not mutually exclusive but are used to identify the activities that typically occur in each phase. If it is determined that the emergency animal disease (EAD) cannot be eradicated, a transition to ongoing management of the disease may take place.

Recovery activities normally occur concurrently with the operational phase and are the responsibility of jurisdictions. These recovery activities are outside the scope of AUSVETPLAN.

Response activities should be based on the function descriptions and checklists provided in Part 2 of the Control Centres Management Manual (CCMM), standard operating procedures appropriate to the disease and industries concerned, and jurisdictional relief and recovery plans.

4.1 Investigation and alert phase

The investigation and alert phase is the period when information is collected to exclude or confirm the existence of an EAD, and the suspicion of a potential EAD is communicated to relevant parties. During the investigation and alert phase, the following activities may be undertaken:

- The likely extent of the potential EAD is scoped.
- Potential operational resource needs are scoped.
- Disease controls are implemented to limit spread of the disease, particularly movement controls within, into and out of suspect premises (SPs).
- Communications material is drafted.
- Stakeholders are alerted and briefed.
- Staff and operations centres are placed on standby.
- Legal instruments are drafted — for example
  - declaration of an outbreak
  - declaration of a livestock standstill, if required
  - definition of the restricted area (RA) and control area (CA)
  - other movement or disease control measures.
- Affected jurisdiction(s) prepare an initial Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan (EADRP).
- Additional stock inspectors may be appointed.
- The Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD) may be established.

Investigation and related activities are usually managed using ‘normal business’ arrangements.

Notification of a possible EAD may come from a number of sources, including private or government veterinarians, laboratory staff, farmers or producers, industry representatives and members of the public.

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Note that the names and descriptions of the response phases in this manual differ from those used in the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement, where they relate to the sharing of eligible response costs between signatories during the overall response.
The Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) is responsible for ensuring that a risk assessment is conducted when a suspect EAD is reported, and that the investigation is managed and prioritised accordingly. The suspect EAD may be assessed as:

- not an EAD
- an unlikely EAD
- a possible EAD
- a likely EAD.

This assessment should be re-evaluated as more information becomes available.

Suitable laboratory samples, and sufficient clinical, gross pathology and epidemiological information must be collected to allow an informed assessment by the CVO.

Where an EAD is possible or likely, surveillance information should be collected and collated without delay using jurisdictional information management systems (see Section 5.2 and Section 5.3). Where an EAD is likely, operational activities may need to commence in this investigation and alert phase.

All personnel involved in EAD responses must keep a record of risk assessments, activities, decisions, telephone calls and conversations. Personnel must maintain confidentiality at this stage because a suspect EAD could potentially affect individuals and trade, even if it is determined not to be an EAD.

### 4.1.1 Actions to be taken by livestock industry

Animal owners or managers, and others who work in livestock-associated industries (including livestock carers, agents, saleyard staff, abattoir staff, stock transporters and animal health advisers) who become aware of unusual or unexplained illness or deaths in animals should:

- seek immediate veterinary advice or report their concerns to the Disease Watch Hotline (1800 675 888)
- isolate sick or dead animals and at-risk animals
- assist the disease investigation (eg by providing information on recent movements of animals or animal products)
- minimise new movements of animals, carcases or animal products while the disease investigation is in progress.

### 4.1.2 Actions to be taken by private or industry veterinarians

Private veterinarians should:

- notify a government veterinary officer (GVO) or the Disease Watch Hotline (1800 675 888) immediately of signs that suggest an EAD
- seek advice from the GVO on what information and samples must be collected, sample submission, and biosecurity measures to minimise the risk of spread of disease
- provide the GVO with a prompt and comprehensive briefing on the investigation
- update the GVO if new information becomes available
- advise the owner or manager on biosecurity measures to minimise the risk of spread of disease.
4.1.3 Actions to be taken by the GVO

The GVO who receives the initial notification from a private veterinarian or other source should:

- document the report of the notification
- undertake further investigation on-site, or oversee and advise on investigations being undertaken by a private or industry veterinarian
- report the suspect EAD to the CVO
- ensure that all information relevant to the EAD investigation is collected, recorded and made available to the CVO for their initial risk assessment
- initiate disease control activities, including securing movements within, into and out of the SP
- alert local animal health personnel.

A summary checklist for the role of the GVO is provided in Appendix 1, and details of the role are provided in Appendix 2.

4.1.4 Actions to be taken by the diagnostic team

When further diagnostic expertise is required, the CVO may arrange for a specialist veterinarian or diagnostic team to visit the SP.

The tasks of the diagnostic team are to:

- collect appropriate samples to ensure that a diagnosis can be confirmed or excluded as quickly as possible
- assist with the clinical evaluation of affected animals
- provide advice to field veterinarians on minimising the risk of spread of disease
- assist with epidemiological investigations, including assessing risk, determining the source of the disease and assessing possible wild animal involvement.

The diagnostic team should have accreditation, or access to skills, in:

- veterinary pathology
- veterinary epidemiology (and/or previous experience with the disease concerned)
- packaging and transport of diagnostic samples
- decontamination procedures.

For more details, see the AUSVETPLAN Laboratory Preparedness Manual.19

4.1.5 Actions to be taken by the state or territory CVO

The CVO must determine the appropriate response based on available field and laboratory information, and other relevant considerations, including economic, environmental, social, political, operational and legal factors. All necessary actions should be taken as soon as possible to limit the potential for the EAD to spread while other factors are being considered.

Although ultimately responsible for the proper investigation of an EAD, the CVO may appoint a State Coordination Centre (SCC) Coordinator during this phase. The SCC Coordinator will be well briefed

on the incident and may assist the rapid activation of an SCC should the incident proceed to the operational phase.

Under the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA), the CVO must notify the chair of the CCEAD within 24 hours of becoming aware of a disease incident. An incident is defined in the EADRA as a confirmed EAD or a reasonably held suspicion of an EAD.

The CVO:
- should keep a log of events, including telephone calls and conversations, beginning as soon as initial notification is received
- will notify the Australian CVO (ACVO), key industry representatives and other stakeholders of a report of a possible or likely EAD
- will advise Victoria’s CVO of samples being submitted to the CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory (CSIRO-AAHL)
- will brief the jurisdictional executive and the relevant minister
- may liaise with other relevant authorities (e.g., health, environment, workplace health and safety)
- may consult technical experts (government and industry)
- may request a meeting of the CCEAD
- will determine the strategic direction during this phase
- may task one or more senior veterinarians with assisting with implementation of the activities listed in Section 4.1.

A summary checklist for the role of the CVO is provided in Appendix 1, and details are provided in Appendix 4.

4.1.6 Actions to be taken by personnel placed on alert

Personnel in noninfected areas of an affected jurisdiction will take action as directed by their CVO, with reference to their jurisdictional emergency response plan, as appropriate. They should:
- review information in relevant AUSVETPLAN disease strategies or enterprise manuals
- check the availability of, or access to, surveillance, quarantine and permit forms
- prepare to move immediately to the Local Control Centre (LCC) or SCC when requested.

After the CCEAD has discussed the event, CVOs in noninfected jurisdictions may advise coordinators of state emergency management arrangements that an EAD may be imminent in the affected jurisdiction.

4.1.7 Actions to be taken by the ACVO and the Department of Agriculture

The ACVO may:
- convene the CCEAD at the request of the CVO of the affected jurisdiction
- alert CSIRO-AAHL and seek interpretation of available laboratory results
- advise the Australian Government Department of Agriculture (DA) Biosecurity, to ensure that appropriate action is taken on trade matters
- advise the Secretary of DA of the potential for the National Management Group (NMG) to be activated
- alert the senior DA executive and the Minister for Agriculture
- consider establishing the National Coordination Centre (NCC)
- place the National Communications Network on standby
- notify the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), if required
- consult with trade areas within DA regarding notification of overseas posts and trading partners.

Specific actions taken by the CCEAD and the NMG during the investigation and alert phase are described in the EADRA and supporting documentation.

Figure 4.1 shows the communication pathways during the investigation and alert phase.
ACVO = Australian Chief Veterinary Officer; CSIRO-AAHL = CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory; CVO = Chief Veterinary Officer; EAD = emergency animal disease; LCC = Local Control Centre; SCC = State Coordination Centre

Figure 4.1  Communication pathways during the investigation and alert phase of an EAD response

4.2 Operational phase

The operational phase begins when the presence of the EAD agent is confirmed and/or the CVO of the affected jurisdiction determines that an operational response must begin. The aim of the operational response is to control the EAD (i.e., eradicate or contain).

During the operational phase, the following activities will be undertaken:
- The CCEAD is established (if not previously established in the investigation and alert phase).
• For diseases where cost-sharing is an option and the EADRA is invoked, the NMG is established. The affected jurisdiction, in consultation with the CCEAD, prepares an EADRP for approval by the NMG (see Schedule 4 of the EADRA, titled ‘Development and management of an EADRP’, and Guide to Developing an Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan21).

• The NMG considers the EADRP. If it is approved, the NMG invokes cost-sharing and advises the date from which cost-sharing is applied. The EADRP may be modified as the response develops.

• The approved EADRP is implemented under state or territory legislation.

• The appropriate response structure — which may include an SCC, LCCs and Forward Command Posts (FCPs) — is fully deployed.

• An NCC may be established.

• Jurisdictional and national whole-of-government and industry emergency management arrangements and response plans may be activated, as appropriate.

• Appropriate financial and disease reporting systems are established.

Specific actions taken by the CCEAD and the NMG during the operational phase are described in the EADRA and supporting documentation.

4.2.1 Actions to be taken by the state or territory CVO

The CVO is responsible for strategic oversight and overall management of the EAD response, and for ensuring that the operational phase is implemented. This includes ensuring that appropriate legal instruments are enacted to support the response. If jurisdictional legislation is inadequate, the CVO may ask the ACVO for approval to use the powers available under the Quarantine Act 1908 (Cwlth).

Appendix 4 describes CVO actions early in the operational phase. For a more detailed description, refer to the CVO role description in Part 2 of the CCMM.

4.2.2 Actions to be taken by the SCC Coordinator

The SCC Coordinator will (note that this is not an exhaustive list):

• identify a suitable location for the SCC
• oversee the establishment of the SCC (if it was not set up in the investigation and alert phase)
• appoint personnel to perform functions within the SCC
• oversee activities performed by the SCC
• appoint an LCC Controller(s) and liaise with them to identify suitable site(s) for the LCC(s)
• agree with the CVO and LCC Controller on the boundaries of the RA and who will be responsible for the operational activities in the CA
• agree on regular reporting schedules with the LCC Controller and SCC Coordination Management Team
• provide regular situation reports to the CVO
• oversee completion and revision, where necessary, of the EADRP
• ensure that response activities are conducted in accordance with jurisdictional legislation and nationally agreed response arrangements
• identify potential risks to the response and possible solutions

• report to the agency's executive (through the appropriate chain of command) on the implementation and progress of planned response activities
• liaise with support agencies and industry
• ensure that a safe work environment is established and maintained
• maintain regular contact with the LCC Controller to ensure effective implementation of the EADRP and support of LCC operations
• establish effective communications with key stakeholders, including industry and the community.

Appendix 5 describes SCC Coordinator actions early in the operational phase. For a more detailed description, refer to the SCC Coordinator role description in Part 2 of the CCMM.

### 4.2.3 Actions to be taken by the LCC Controller

The LCC Controller will:
• oversee the establishment of the LCC (if it was not set up in the investigation and alert phase)
• appoint personnel to perform the functions of the LCC
• oversee activities performed by the LCC in the area for which the LCC has been made responsible (as confirmed by the CVO)
• oversee the development and implementation of the Incident Action Plan, in accordance with the EADRP
• agree on regular reporting schedules with the SCC Coordinator and the LCC Incident Management Team
• provide regular situation reports to the SCC Coordinator
• ensure that a safe work environment is established and maintained at the LCC and in the field
• request appointment of liaison personnel for support agencies, local industry and the local community
• brief the SCC Coordinator on the implementation of the EADRP.

Appendix 6 describes LCC Controller actions early in the operational phase. For a more detailed description, refer to the LCC Controller role description in Part 2 of the CCMM.

### 4.2.4 Actions to be taken by the GVO when infection is detected on a premises

The GVO should maintain biosecurity measures and continue actions started in the investigation and alert phase (Section 4.1.3) until they are relieved or otherwise directed by the LCC. It is recommended that the GVO be relieved quickly so that they may proceed to the LCC, where they can provide local information. Communication between the GVO and LCC epidemiology personnel should be considered, to ensure that all relevant epidemiological information is collected from the premises at the outset of the response.
4.2.5  Actions to be taken by the ACVO and the Department of Agriculture

At the international level, DA may:

• endeavour to maintain market access by providing technical briefings and other information to trading partners and overseas posts
• trace relevant exported agricultural commodities and animals
• assist with tracing relevant imported agricultural commodities and imported animals
• meet Australia’s international reporting obligations (eg to the OIE and World Trade Organization)
• coordinate information for, and monitor, the media (including news) and the internet
• coordinate acquisition of overseas assistance through the International Animal Health Emergency Reserve.

At the national level, the ACVO and DA may:

• convene, chair and provide secretariat support to the CCEAD and the NMG
• coordinate agreed talking points for use by ministers, CVOs and industry
• prepare national situation reports for the minister, DA Secretary and DA
• coordinate public information through the National Communications Network
• coordinate national response strategies, and monitor state and territory activities
• provide strategic analysis for EAD control options, including their broader and longer-term implications
• provide the affected state or territory with technical policy advice and assistance on national or international issues
• provide epidemiological expertise to support strategic decision making
• invoke provisions under appropriate Commonwealth legislation
• coordinate the deployment and application of established resource pools, such as the national Rapid Response Team and the Australian Veterinary Reserve.

At the national level, DA may also:

• provide timely and accurate information to the minister’s office
• liaise with and coordinate other Australian Government agencies
• manage the Australian Government’s public information strategy, in consultation with relevant jurisdictions.

4.2.6  Actions to be taken by private or industry veterinary practitioners

Private or industry veterinary practitioners should:

• promptly report any suspect cases to a control centre (SCC or LCC) or the Disease Watch Hotline (1800 675 888)
• update their knowledge of the specific EAD by consulting relevant AUSVETPLAN manuals and other sources
• implement biosecurity control measures (including use of personal protective equipment) in accordance with AUSVETPLAN, or advice from the CVO or LCC
• establish links with an authoritative source (eg their industry body, jurisdictional website) to ensure awareness of the current situation and control measures
• ensure that information provided to clients, staff and the public is consistent with that from the control centres
• comply with the directions of the CVO and control centres
• provide advice to clients and act as a focal point for community engagement
• raise any concerns about the implementation of control measures with the Liaison — Veterinary Practitioners function at the LCC
• consider providing local veterinary services (eg surveillance, vaccination) to support the response.

4.2.7 Actions to be taken by affected industries

Affected industries should:
• promptly report any suspect cases to the LCC or Disease Watch Hotline (1800 675 888)
• implement biosecurity control measures in accordance with industry biosecurity plans and AUSVETPLAN, and advice from the CVO and LCC
• provide trained representatives who have the authority to speak and make decisions for the industry at CCEAD and NMG meetings
• provide trained Liaison — Livestock Industry personnel to the SCC and LCC for the length of the response; these people should have authority to communicate secure information to and from the operation, or the ability to quickly obtain the required authorisation
• ensure that information on control measures and other key messages are communicated effectively to all industry members
• ensure that industry concerns are raised with the Liaison — Livestock Industry personnel in the SCC and LCC
• contribute to discussion on proposed control measures.

4.2.8 Actions to be taken in nonaffected areas

Advice on operations will be provided to key government and industry personnel in nonaffected areas as deemed appropriate by the state or territory CVO.

Possible actions may include:
• a stocktake of available staff and resources
• surveillance to detect the EAD or for proof of freedom
• movement controls to minimise the risk of disease entry into the nonaffected area
• vaccination
• heightened biosecurity protocols
• stakeholder communications.

4.3 Proof-of-freedom phase

The proof-of-freedom phase is the period in which monitoring, surveillance and/or research are conducted to collect data to provide evidence that regions or zones are free from disease. This is a
key step in removing restrictions and progressing towards disease control (ie eradication or containment).

The proof-of-freedom phase begins when authorities are confident that the EAD has been controlled, and all indications are that the EAD has been eradicated in one or more regions. It may run concurrently with the operational phase. The proof-of-freedom phase is completed when the NMG determines (on advice from the CCEAD) that there is sufficient epidemiological evidence that the EAD has been eradicated. If it is determined that the EAD cannot be eradicated, a transition to ongoing management of the disease may take place.

Depending on the scale of activities, the proof-of-freedom phase may require significant physical, laboratory and staff resources.

Maintaining restrictions on regions for long periods has important implications for resource management, animal welfare, business continuity, and socioeconomic impacts on producers and regional communities. It is not necessary to wait until disease has been eradicated in all infected areas before commencing proof-of-freedom activities. This is especially the case where the EAD outbreak involves multiple foci of infection, with possibly several jurisdictions involved. Since disease might be controlled at different rates in different regions, there may be an opportunity to progressively lift restrictions on an area basis. This would involve reclassifying previously declared areas (RAs and CAs), with a staged approach to lifting of movement restrictions. This is a key step in the recovery process and will have positive community benefits.

### 4.3.1 Reclassifying previously infected areas

The key principles for reclassifying a previously declared area are as follows:

- The area is epidemiologically distinct from other declared areas.
- All trace premises and SPs have been investigated and reclassified; and all infected premises (IPs), dangerous contact premises (DCPs) and dangerous contact processing facilities in the area have been reclassified as resolved premises.
- All tracing and surveillance associated with control has been completed satisfactorily, with no evidence or suspicion of infection in the area.
- A minimum period of two incubation periods has elapsed since depopulation and decontamination were completed on the last IP or DCP in the area.
- An approved surveillance program has confirmed no evidence of infection in the RA.

The CVO of the affected jurisdiction manages lifting of restrictions under jurisdictional legislation and consistent with the current agreed EADRP. When the appropriate conditions are satisfied, an affected jurisdiction can, in consultation with the CCEAD, reduce the size of the RA or lift all restrictions. The part of the RA where restrictions have been lifted would then become part of the CA. Jurisdictions should be able to present documented evidence that the appropriate conditions have been met.

When an RA is lifted and becomes part of the CA, it will have a lower risk status, and the movement restrictions that apply will be consistent with those applying in the CA. Over time, all of the RAs will be reduced and lifted.

If more than one jurisdiction is affected, each will use its own legal mechanisms to lift the declaration of the RA or CA, coordinating with each other and consulting with the CCEAD.

After a further period of surveillance and monitoring, provided that this finds no evidence of infection, a jurisdiction, in consultation with the CCEAD, would lift the CA. This would result in the lifting of all the remaining regulatory controls associated with the response, and a return to business as usual.
4.3.2 Regaining disease-free status

Any application to the OIE or trading partners for recognition of country or zone freedom should be based on the OIE *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* chapters on the disease and general surveillance. Depending on the disease, there may be specific requirements for clinical surveillance, serological surveys, or targeted sampling or monitoring, in addition to any testing that may have been done during the operational phase as part of reclassifying previously infected areas. A formal report by Australian authorities, detailing the disease control procedures, the surveillance program and the results obtained, will be required. Regaining access to export markets following an EAD outbreak will most likely have to be negotiated with individual trading partners and may take considerably longer than the minimum periods for regaining disease-free status that are prescribed in the OIE Terrestrial Code.

4.4 Stand-down phase

The stand-down phase begins when:

- the investigation and alert phase fails to confirm the presence of an EAD
- the EAD has been eradicated
- eradication of the EAD is not considered feasible, cost-effective or beneficial, or
- the NMG formally declares that the EAD outbreak is over.

During the stand-down phase, the following activities take place:

- If the presence of the EAD is not confirmed, people and agencies contacted during the investigation and alert phase (see Section 4.1) are notified that the disease has not been confirmed.
- If control and eradication measures have been undertaken, a senior operational manager ensures that a written plan is developed and implemented so that operations are wound up systematically.
- The SCC and LCC(s)
  - develop and implement an ongoing management program, if required
  - recover, decommission and dispose of stores and equipment
  - arrange appropriate archiving of all records
  - finalise accounts
  - conduct debriefings and record all learnings.
- The CCEAD (if established for the response) concludes its activities, arranges for a final report and stands down.
- The NMG (if established for the response) concludes its activities and stands down.

Specific actions taken by the CCEAD and the NMG during the stand-down phase are described in the EADRA and supporting documentation.

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22 www.oie.int/index.php?id=169&L=0&htmfile=chapitre_surveillance_general.htm
5 Information and resources management

An effective and efficient emergency animal disease (EAD) response operation requires a considerable resource management effort. It involves the application of a range of resources, including:

- information
- personnel
- finance
- physical resources (plant and equipment, stores, facilities)
- systems
- services.

The resource requirements will expand rapidly. Early establishment of effective systems and processes is necessary to ensure that provision is made for:

- policy, procedures and work instructions
- authority for operational activity and the expenditure of funds
- acquisition, verification, sharing and storage of information
- management and leadership
- safety and welfare
- proper acquisition, accounting, decommissioning and disposal of resources
- personnel induction and training
- security for premises, control centres, stores and equipment
- audit and performance monitoring.

Policy decisions made at national, and state and territory levels will provide or confirm the overall strategic direction. Jurisdictions are responsible for operational planning, and for establishing and maintaining effective resource management systems, having regard to national plans and response policy decisions. Projection of resource requirements is undertaken within the planning function, while acquisition and delivery is a logistics role.

As described in Section 3.2.8, the management framework includes the following functional groupings:

- coordination and control
- liaison
- public information
- planning
- operations
- logistics
- finance and administration.

Each of those functions has resource and information needs, as well as responsibility for different aspects of resource management. Most of the required systems and processes are already in place within jurisdictional agencies and should be applied, adapted or expanded.

Although there are key differences between normal business and response operations, the usual statutory obligations apply during an emergency situation. Jurisdictions are responsible for ensuring that activities are undertaken only with the appropriate authority. This applies to statutory
functions that need to be exercised as part of operational activity, and to administration of resources, starting with approval for procurement action that leads to the expenditure of funds. Early action is required to ensure that appropriate response personnel are delegated the necessary authority for their respective roles, and that all response personnel are informed of the arrangements and requirements in relation to administration of resources.

Forecasting of resource requirements is an important role of the planning function. This requires specialist personnel who are trained to focus on predicting the future needs of the operation for short, medium and long timeframes.

Systems applied to administration and accounting for resources during an EAD response need to be wound up and summarised as part of the stand-down phase. Care must be taken to ensure that adequate arrangements are put in place to enable residual administrative action, compliance with legal obligations, reporting and review after the event.

5.1 Communication and information management

EAD response operations generate a great deal of information that plays a key part in every aspect of the response. An EAD response requires effective communication and information management systems to enable sharing and effective use of information to support decision making, maintenance of stakeholder relations, management of resources, maintenance of records and so on. This includes the exchange of information among State Coordination Centres (SCCs) and Local Control Centres (LCCs), among teams and individuals working in a response, and between the EAD response organisation and other organisations that are directly affected by the disease.

Communication and information management will be most effective when there are adequate support staff for each unit within the centre.

5.1.1 Shared situational awareness

It is vital that the management teams keep track of the response and its consequences by establishing an information system that provides a comprehensive and coherent representation of key data that are continuously being updated to reflect the current situation.

Maintenance of the situational ‘picture’ is a responsibility of the planning function. The Coordination Management Team (CMT) and Incident Management Team (IMT) are the end users of that ‘picture’, which will inform their perception, comprehension and projection of future developments.

5.1.2 Communication and reporting

To enable effective maintenance of situational awareness, functional managers and team leaders within SCCs and LCCs, or in the field, must collaborate and provide regular and timely reports of the progress of their assigned tasks and any emerging developments.

Specific requirements for reporting, such as timing and frequency, must be included in action plans at all levels. However, reporting of progress and issues needs to become an instinctive action for all response personnel. It is essential that situation reports are provided in accordance with set timeframes, taking into account the need for information to be used in higher-level reporting and decision processes. Situation reports should be based on the situation at the prescribed reporting time and not delayed pending completion of other tasks or events.
5.1.3 Briefing and debriefing

Effective and timely briefing and debriefing are crucial to the effective functioning of SCCs and LCCs, and the conduct of field operations. It is essential that all those involved in the incident understand:

- the aim and operational objectives of the response
- current strategies being applied to control the disease
- relevant safety and welfare issues
- their role in the operation
- reporting relationships and requirements.

Personnel joining an EAD response should receive a briefing as part of their initial induction (see Section 5.6.1).

Within SCCs, LCCs and Forward Command Posts, the relevant senior manager should formally brief all personnel every day, or more frequently if necessary. Section managers, unit heads and team leaders should also provide briefings tailored to the task assignments of their work group. Records of briefings and debriefings must be kept. The outcomes from debriefings must be collated so that they can be used during the overall evaluation of the response.

The following nationally agreed standard operating procedures are relevant:

- NASOP No. 46 — Conducting Briefings in a Biosecurity Response
- NASOP No. 47 — Providing and Receiving Handovers During a Biosecurity Response
- NASOP No. 48 — Conducting Debriefings in a Biosecurity Response.

5.1.4 Situation reports

Reports on progress and key events are made by sending a situation report. Situation reports should be used at all levels of the EAD response structure. They should be forwarded as directed in the relevant Incident Action Plan, or specifically to report an occurrence (e.g., an occurrence likely to disrupt operations) or change in circumstances (e.g., completion of a major task).

Situation reports will also be issued periodically, usually daily, by SCCs and LCCs to summarise the overall situation. Jurisdictional situation reports will be exchanged with the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, other affected states and territories, industry and supporting organisations. Key points may be released to the media and the wider community.

See the situation report template in Biosecurity Emergency Management — Response Planning Guide.23

5.2 Information management systems

Information relevant to an incident should be managed in line with the following principles:

- collection
- collation
- interpretation
- dissemination
- access and retrieval

5.2.1 Collection

Information regarding an event will be collected from a number of sources within the SCC or LCC, and from external sources. Collection of information should be proactive to ensure that the information is received in a timely manner. During collection, the following should be considered:

- Information collection must be planned.
- Information must be actively sought.
- Information must be timely to be of value.
- Effective liaison is essential.
- Information must be accurate, authentic and reliable.
- Information must be recorded in a timely manner.

Sources of information that should be sought and considered include:

- team reports
- debriefing reports
- reports from the Liaison — Livestock Industry function and other Liaison functions
- reports from the public
- policy decisions
- relevant jurisdictional and national electronic information systems (eg the National Livestock Identification System)
- permits
- media.

5.2.2 Collation

Because information will be received in a number of formats, it must be collated in an appropriate manner, so that decision makers can access it. In collating information, the following should be considered:

- Methods must be simple to use.
- Systems must be reliable.
- Systems must be accessible for use.
- Systems must allow cross-referencing and linking to related information.
- Systems must allow rapid retrieval.
- The database application used for collation of response information of a certain type must be standard across all levels of the response.

To ensure that incident information is effectively collated, the Records Management function (within the Finance and Administration Section — see Part 2) will provide guidance to the CMT and IMT on information management activities and standards (eg document numbering systems). The Records Management function will also be responsible for:

- establishing and maintaining a central filing system for the response so that all records are secured
• establishing and maintaining a central registry service so that information flows in a managed, efficient and secure manner. This includes a system to register all incoming and outgoing telephone, radio, mail, fax and email communication for the response
• managing response records (including messages, approvals, property information, task requests, plans, meeting records and situation reports). This includes recording and/or filing them so that they can be retrieved in a timely manner, and distributing copies to response personnel, as required.

5.2.3 Interpretation

Interpretation is the processing of available information into a relevant and usable format. Information that has been collected and collated should not be relied upon until it has been properly interpreted, usually by the appropriate specialists for an area.

Once analysed, information can be used to draw conclusions, consider actions, develop plans and so on. All staff involved in the incident will have responsibility for interpreting information and ensuring that it is disseminated to appropriate people, in an appropriate manner.

5.2.4 Dissemination

The SCC Coordinator and LCC Controller, and their respective CMT and IMT, are responsible for ensuring that the content and timing of information disseminated to stakeholders are consistent with the agreed communication strategy for the incident. Stakeholders may include:

• the minister
• the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO)
• members of the CMT and IMT
• other departmental staff, including regional managers
• agricultural industries
• the general public (including the media)
• suppliers and service providers
• other jurisdictions.

Each of these stakeholders has different information requirements.

Within the SCC and LCC, it is critical that all appropriate functional areas are advised of relevant information in a timely manner. Maximum use should be made of visual displays of current, summarised information.

Figure 6.1 shows major information flows during an EAD response.
5.2.5 Forms

Communication within and between SCCs and LCCs will be aided by prepared form templates. For information management and sharing, key forms include:

- records of conversation
- task requests
- incident logs or operations logs
- Incident Action Plans
- situation reports.

5.2.6 Storage and retention (registry)

The registry is the heart of a response information management system. A registry should be established in each SCC and LCC, and operated within the Finance and Administration function, to provide a central point for collection, verification, indexing and storage of response information. In
addition, each functional section needs to establish arrangements for recording key communications, requests generated and received, and actions taken by the section.

The choice of an information management system is a matter for jurisdictions. In all cases, there should be jurisdictional standard operating procedures for information management. These should detail the essential business rules for the collection, sharing and storage of documents and other information. The principal rules are:

- All official conversations, messages, key events and decisions should be recorded in writing.
- All documents, including records of conversation, maps, photographs and display boards, must include the time and date of their creation or currency.
- All original documents belong to the response organisation and must be filed in the central registry.
- All records must be kept in accordance with relevant legal and archival requirements.

5.2.7 Security

Although personnel routinely manage information and relationships with stakeholders in a responsible and prudent manner, some EAD responses are highly sensitive; as a result, incident information should only be circulated to those who have a ‘need to know’. This means that:

- some information will be restricted to the executive levels
- information may only be released to key specified positions
- the decision to release information to the public is taken by the SCC Coordinator or LCC Controller
- information may not be passed outside the CMT or IMT without approval
- CMT and IMT members should not assume that all members of the CMT or IMT are aware of all information.

Information obtained during the course of an incident must only be used for the purpose for which that information was provided. Therefore, staff are not at liberty to disseminate information relating to an incident to associates, contacts, friends or family.

5.3 Operational information management systems

Electronic systems facilitate the management of disease surveillance, monitoring, tracing and control activities at the LCC; allow access to secure data and other disease information for the SCC; and assist aggregation of the information at the national level.

Systems used to record operational data and generate reports for an EAD response should:

- allow management of disease information
- allow collection, storage and retrieval of information about
  - inspections of premises
  - progress in eradication
  - priorities of traces
  - surveillance activities
  - resources
- interface with existing jurisdictional systems.

Where a response is mounted across jurisdictional borders, the use of compatible systems may facilitate information sharing.
All SCC and LCC personnel should be familiar with the systems being used. Access to the system (or parts of it) will be allocated by the heads of the SCC or LCC Biosecurity Information Systems function in the Planning section of the SCC or LCC (see Part 2 of the Control Centres Management Manual for detailed function descriptions).

5.3.1 Geographic information systems

Both the LCC and the SCC record spatial data for elements of the response, including boundaries of the restricted area (RA) and control area (CA), infected premises (IPs) and other premises, carcass disposal sites, and other locations that are relevant to the response.

These data need to be recorded in a geographic information system (GIS) and/or a spatially enabled information management system — that is, a computer application that is specifically designed for the capture, storage, retrieval, analysis and display of spatial data. The spatial data are critical to the ability of the SCC and LCC to conduct a well-informed and timely response.

The GIS will provide products for graphic display (e.g. maps) and for collation at the national level. Data must be able to be exported in an agreed format, for reporting and analytical purposes at all levels.

Mapping is an important element in maintaining situational awareness within a response. Online mapping capacity assists the SCC and LCC to coordinate briefings and plan future response activities. Data for the maps will come from several sources, including from within the SCC and LCC, and from jurisdictional databases. The ability of an SCC or LCC to supply a range of spatial representations will depend on internet capacity, since not all data will be held on the centre’s server. Within the SCC or LCC, specialist mapping must show relevant information, including RA and CA boundaries, livestock standstill zones, IPs, dangerous contact premises and other premises with susceptible stock.

Systems that provide the ability to regenerate maps of the situation on any given day must be put in place. Requests for mapping outputs should be overseen by the Planning Management function. Nationally recognised mapping symbology and, as far as possible, standard products should be used.

Some freeware may be very useful for localised activities and limit the resource impost on the centres’ GIS personnel. Any freeware endorsed for use must be cleared by the senior information systems manager and clearly identified for the relevant end users. Information must be provided on recommended access and download methods, preferred uses, and records management practices.

It is important that requests for GIS products are managed so that limited resources are not overloaded.

5.4 Public information

Provision of information to, and consultation with, affected industries and communities is a vital communications task.

The Public Information function (previously referred to as ‘public relations’ or ‘communications’) manages a two-way flow of information. It involves:

- providing accurate and up-to-date information to stakeholders, the media and the public
- handling incoming requests for information from stakeholders, the media and the public

The Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual24 provides guidance on undertaking a nationally consistent communications response to biosecurity incidents, including EAD outbreaks. The

National Communications Network is tasked with producing and disseminating nationally consistent public information in a biosecurity response.

At the SCC and LCC, the individual performing the Public Information Management function is a member of the CMT and IMT, respectively. The CVO may also involve this person in national coordination meetings.

All response personnel must receive clear direction on policy relating to release of information, and commenting on the outbreak or response operations. Staff should be informed about the sensitivity of some information and the need to maintain confidentiality during off-duty activities. They should also be made aware of standards for factual recording of events during a response.

Consideration should be given at the outset to appointing a suitably senior and credible media spokesperson.

Management of public enquiries and complaints may require dedicated staffing and recording systems.

### 5.5 Operational communication systems

An EAD response will require use of a range of communication types, and devices and systems for handling information. These include:

- telephone
- facsimile
- email
- internet, intranet and extranet
- social media
- possibly two-way radio.

Jurisdictions are responsible for establishing and managing systems appropriate to their circumstances and operational requirements.

The electronic information management systems used within SCCs and LCCs will play a critical role in communication and information management. When established, SCCs and LCCs are likely to have access to the normal suite of systems used within the host jurisdiction, such as email and intranet. Jurisdictions are responsible for ensuring adequate privacy provisions, security, technical support and, where possible, networking of systems.

### 5.6 Human and physical resource management

A range of systems will be required to manage the various resources required to support an EAD response. The standard departmental systems for procurement, accounting, personnel administration and so on should be used.

#### 5.6.1 Human resources

Effective response to a major EAD outbreak will require personnel in numbers likely to exceed the capacity of any one jurisdiction. Several hundred people with a wide range of skills may be required, possibly for several months.
During an outbreak, the affected jurisdiction is responsible for establishing and staffing an incident management structure, and for sustaining response operations. Managing emergency operations requires identifiable skills, knowledge and abilities, especially to work effectively in and/or lead teams so that necessary resources can be efficiently mobilised, deployed and directed to combat the EAD. The specialist nature, and the likely breadth and depth of impact of EADs means that responses can be more efficient when key personnel can access specific training for EAD response operations, which is integrated with their jurisdiction’s emergency management arrangements and systems.

Section 9.2 of the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) outlines the expectations relating to the qualification of response personnel. Preferably, key personnel will be accredited under Animal Health Australia’s EAD training program. Each party to the EADRA must maintain an appropriate capability for EAD responses.

The responsible agency's resources may be augmented through a combination of:

- reassignment of resources within the agency
- hiring of additional staff, either directly or through employment agencies
- jurisdictional emergency management arrangements
- sharing of jurisdictional, national or international resources; requests should be directed as follows
  - for biosecurity (‘technical’) resources, through the National Coordination Centre (NCC; see Section 3.2.3)
  - for other nontechnical resources, through
    ▪ arrangements between state and territory agencies (both within and between jurisdictions), through agreed jurisdictional liaisons and relevant SCC or LCC personnel
    ▪ the Attorney-General’s Department under COMDISPLAN (Commonwealth Disaster Response Plan) arrangements, which include most categories of assistance under the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community arrangements; requests to the Attorney-General’s Department are made via the agreed jurisdictional liaison arrangements
  - for international resources, through the NCC, using the International Animal Health Emergency Reserve.

As a result of these arrangements, a response organisation may include personnel from a variety of backgrounds, with varying levels of knowledge and awareness of the operating environment. For new staff to be successfully integrated into the operating environment, it is critical that they receive thorough induction, instruction, briefing and, where necessary, training before starting and during response activities.

Personnel employed for an EAD response are remunerated in accordance with the relevant industrial and employment arrangements of their hiring organisation.

Private veterinarians involved in the response may be engaged as government employees or contractors. Guidelines have been drafted for the employment of private veterinarians in EAD responses. Professional indemnity should be provided by employers; alternatively, contractors should obtain appropriate levels of professional indemnity insurance.

5.6.2 Safety and welfare

The safety and wellbeing of response personnel must always have the highest priority in the conduct of operations. Legislation and codes of practice require the implementation and maintenance of a

management system to support the health, safety and wellbeing of personnel. The workplace health and safety guidelines of the lead agency should be used.

The nature of emergency responses often increases the risk of injury, illness and fatigue in response personnel. Staff backfilling for response personnel may also be at increased risk.

See also Section 2.4.6.

5.7 Finance

The lead agency within the affected jurisdiction is responsible for keeping auditable records of all expenditure with respect to operations conducted under the Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan (EADRP).

Jurisdictional arrangements and systems will be applied to manage funds associated with an EAD response. Normal jurisdictional financial delegations and management arrangements must be maintained. It is essential that delegations are sought for appropriate response personnel.

The cost of the investigation and alert phase, which broadly corresponds to the incident definition phase under the EADRA, is met by the state or territory. The EADRA requires the state or territory to meet the costs incurred in this period but allows exceptions for compensation costs and diagnostic costs under certain conditions. Eligible costs incurred in the emergency response and proof-of-freedom phases can be cost-shared under the EADRA. When the National Management Group approves an EADRP under the EADRA, cost-sharing will be in accordance with Clause 10.2 of the EADRA.

5.8 Physical resources and services

EAD responses require a wide range of stores, plant and equipment, facilities, and services. Normal jurisdictional administrative processes should be applied to their acquisition, management and ultimate disposal.

The establishment of SCCs and LCCs requires access to suitable premises, either within existing agency accommodation or through other arrangements (see NASOP 02 — Selecting an LCC Location\(^{26}\)).

SCCs, LCCs and other sites used in the response should have appropriate physical and electronic security arrangements, to ensure protection of valuable assets and confidential information.

A range of service providers may be engaged to provide specialist support and to augment response resources. This requires attention to relevant aspects of safety and security. Good records should be kept of contractor visits to response locations.

# Appendix 1: Summary checklist for senior personnel during investigation and alert phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Person responsible</th>
<th>GVO (see also Appendix 2)</th>
<th>Senior GVO (see also Appendix 3)</th>
<th>CVO (see also Appendix 4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Notify senior officer or CVO of suspicious incident</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaise with property owner or manager</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct workplace health and safety assessment of field situation, and ensure risks are eliminated or treated</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct field investigations, including disinfection procedures</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Quarantine property</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Complete surveillance forms</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide investigation and property details, including surveillance information, to SCC Coordinator or CVO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyse surveillance information</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Appoint and dispatch diagnostic team or equivalent, if required</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notify Victorian CVO, CSIRO-AAHL and state laboratory of sample dispatch</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify urgent traces</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide support to GVO or private practitioner</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meet to define incident, resourcing, phase of response, etc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide confidential brief to ACVO, other CVOs or CCEAD, and industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief jurisdictional communications personnel and allocate tasks for drafting or updating of communications material, including staff alerts, veterinarian alerts/bulletins, talking points, press releases and web material</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief executive and minister</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACVO = Australian Chief Veterinary Officer; CCEAD = Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases; CSIRO-AAHL = CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory; CVO = Chief Veterinary Officer; GVO = government veterinary officer; SCC = State Coordination Centre
Appendix 2: Checklist for government veterinary officer

Investigation and alert phase

If there is suspicion of an emergency animal disease (EAD), the government veterinary officer (GVO) should notify a senior GVO (SGVO) or, if one is not available, the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO), of the details of the premises and suspected disease. The GVO should then do the following:

- Check to ensure that adequate supplies are carried in their vehicle, including:
  - protective clothing
  - disinfectant
  - equipment for collecting samples
  - appropriate field surveillance forms from the jurisdiction’s information management system
  - the state or territory EAD action plan or this manual.
- Where possible, notify office staff of intended actions and request that the investigation be kept confidential.
- Go to the suspect premises.
- Leave vehicles outside the premises (where it is practical to do so).
- Leave a set of street clothes in the vehicle.
- Put on disposable overalls and clean, waterproof protective clothing. Wash boots and waterproof protective clothing with disinfectant before entering the premises (see the Decontamination Manual).
- Take appropriate history and begin filling in field surveillance forms.
- Examine affected and at-risk animals.
- If an EAD cannot be excluded, but is still considered a remote or low probability, collect appropriate samples, in collaboration with relevant laboratory staff.
- If it is uncertain whether an EAD is involved and further assistance is required, contact the SGVO or CVO, who may arrange assistance from a diagnostic team after reviewing the case.
- To promote owner cooperation, discuss with the owner details of the disease suspected and the actions that will be taken.
- Notify the SGVO or the CVO of the outcome of the investigation and provide details (verbally, followed by submission of surveillance forms) of:
  - the owner’s name, address and telephone number
  - the nature of the disease suspected
  - the exact location of the suspected case(s)
  - findings from the examination of affected animals
  - numbers and descriptions of affected and at-risk animals
  - any need for quarantine
  - any urgent tracings
  - whether assistance is needed — for example, to muster stock
  - decontamination that may need to be arranged for people, animal products or objects that have left the property recently
  - the property identification code (unique property identifier or GPS coordinates).
- Collect other information relating to the property to assist potential operations (eg electricity, access).
On leaving the property, the GVO (and the diagnostic team, if one is appointed) should do the following:

- Give the owner departmental contact telephone numbers.
- Wash down and clean protective clothing and boots with a recommended disinfectant.
- Wash hands and exposed skin, and clean fingernails, with a recommended disinfectant.
- Supervise the same procedures for other people.
- Remove protective clothing, place it in a large plastic bag or garbage bin, and thoroughly soak it in a recommended disinfectant (see the Decontamination Manual).
- Avoid contact with any other susceptible species until cleared by the SGVO.
- Maintain a written diary of events.

If the suspicion of an EAD is high, and after consultation with the SGVO or CVO, the GVO should do the following in addition to the actions listed above:

- Complete surveillance forms (if not already completed) and report to the SGVO or CVO to fully describe the situation, pending completion of the forms and progressive reporting.
- Serve the owner or person in charge a notice of quarantine (if this has not already been done).
- Collect relevant history and complete surveillance forms.
- Restrict the movement of people and animals within the premises.
- Restrict entry or departure of people, animals, animal products, vehicles and other things, appropriate to the specific disease and according to the relevant Disease Strategy.
- Arrange for the boundaries to be secured; this includes wiring up or locking gates so that only one gate, which can be controlled, is left as an entrance to the premises.
- Identify susceptible wild (including feral) animals on the premises and in the area.
- Present the diagnostic team (if one is appointed) with animals showing the full range of clinical signs.
- Where possible, move animals away from boundary fences to a central location, preferably to a site that will make any required destruction, disposal and disinfection easier.
- Ensure that a telephone (or other suitable communication device) is constantly attended.
- Before leaving the suspect premises, ensure that risk-based procedures are in place to allow personal/family movement on and off the property for essential purposes.
- When leaving the property, ensure that full decontamination procedures are followed.

**Operational phase**

At the initial infected premises (IP), the GVO or their delegate must proceed as follows:

- Perform the tasks of the Infected Premises Site Supervision function (see Part 2 of the Control Centres Management Manual, FLD OP 04) until relieved by resources directed from the Local Control Centre (LCC).
- Consult and liaise with the owner to plan IP activities, ensuring owner involvement to assist in recovery. This may include
  - reinforcing the quarantine requirements and ensuring adequate property security
  - implementing appropriate disinfection procedures (see the Decontamination Manual).
- Provide advice to the LCC (or the State Coordination Centre, if necessary) on the resource requirements for preliminary, but urgent, destruction and disposal of infected and at-risk stock, and contaminated materials (where this is part of the relevant Disease Strategy).
- Where possible (if not already done), confine all roaming stock.
• Make a preliminary assessment of suitable destruction procedures and locations (see the **Destruction Manual**).
• Assess suitable sites for disposal of animals and contaminated materials (see the **Disposal Manual**).
• If necessary and possible, muster stock, beginning with the groups most at risk, to a central location that has been identified as suitable for destruction and disposal.
• Maintain records of any stock that die, and compile an accurate inventory of remaining stock, including descriptions of animals for valuation purposes.
• Assess occupational health and safety risks for on-site operations.
• Provide for the welfare of the personnel on the property by ensuring that their short-term needs for food and other requirements are met.
Appendix 3: Checklist for senior government veterinary officer

Investigation and alert phase

The senior government veterinary officer (SGVO) should undertake the following actions during the investigation and alert phase of an emergency animal disease (EAD) incident:

- Analyse and seek clarification of information provided by the government veterinary officer (GVO).
- Analyse and evaluate initial details reported by the GVO on their field surveillance forms, and ensure that data are entered into the jurisdictional information management system.
- If necessary, notify the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) of the suspicious disease incident and actions being taken.
- Provide support and resources to the GVO, as required.
- If required, take steps to limit the spread of disease by instructing the GVO to do some or all of the following
  - stop stock and product movements into and out of suspect premises (SPs) or suspect areas by the imposition of quarantine
  - allow the movement of people such as the owner or veterinarians into or out of SPs or suspect areas, subject to specified conditions
  - identify urgent trace-forwards and trace-backs
  - identify risk establishments that may be important in disease spread.
- Maintain a diary of events.

The SGVO may also do the following:

- Take appropriate action on traces and risk establishments to limit the spread of the suspected EAD.
- Prepare recommendations for the declaration of restricted and control areas for submission to the CVO, in line with procedures set out in the relevant Disease Strategy.
- Develop proposals for personnel and other resource requirements for
  - Local Control Centre (LCC) operations
  - the remainder of the region.

When requested by the CVO, the SGVO should advise the following people in the affected districts:

- other field GVOs and animal health officers
- local departmental personnel and management
- private veterinary practitioners
- key industry contacts
- the director of any local veterinary laboratory
- local government
- the police (emergency management) coordinator
- the relevant emergency management communications contact officer.
The SGVO should inform the people listed above:

- that AUSVETPLAN is in the investigation and alert phase
- of the nature of the suspected EAD
- of the locations of the SP(s)
- of any actions required of them.

**Operational phase**

If an EAD is confirmed, the tasks and responsibilities of the SGVO will be taken over by various LCC and State Coordination Centre (SCC) personnel, who will be responsible for ongoing communication with the people and agencies listed above. There should be a formal handover to the SCC Management function after declaration of the operational phase.

**Stand-down phase**

If the presence of an EAD is not confirmed, the people and agencies previously notified must be advised by the SGVO that the EAD has not been confirmed and that no further action is required.
Appendix 4: Checklist for Chief Veterinary Officer

Investigation and alert phase

The Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) should undertake the following actions during the investigation and alert phase of an emergency animal disease (EAD) incident:

- Initiate procedures to confirm the incident.
- With the senior government veterinary officer, develop a strategy for the disease investigation.
- Arrange for the collection of samples by a diagnostic team (if one is appointed by the CVO) or government veterinary officer (GVO) and submission of the samples to the relevant veterinary laboratory for diagnosis.
- Meet with senior staff to define the incident and confirm the investigation response and assess the incident to determine appropriate resource allocation.
- Consider a confidential brief to other CVOs and industries that might be affected. This will need to be done before information is released to the public.
- If appropriate, brief the jurisdiction’s executive, the jurisdiction’s minister, the Australian CVO and the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD), the CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory (CSIRO-AAHL).
- Maintain a suitable response until the incident is fully defined and categorised. Further actions may be to appoint the Local Control Centre (LCC) Controller and place them on stand-by, appoint the State Coordination Centre (SCC) Coordinator and personnel to SCC management functions, with the SCC Coordinator, identify the SCC location and activate the SCC, request a meeting of the CCEAD, direct SCC Planning Management to begin preparing an EAD Response Plan (EADRP), in accordance with the EAD Response Agreement (EADRA), appoint an interim media spokesperson, inform key industry personnel and the emergency services contact officer (listed in the jurisdiction’s emergency management functional plan) of any actions required of them, direct the SCC Coordinator and LCC Controller to assess personnel and resources required should AUSVETPLAN be elevated to the operational phase.

If a negative diagnosis is established, the CVO’s notes and any other reports should be filed as a ‘negative emergency disease alert’ for reporting in the format agreed by the National Animal Health Information System.

Operational phase

If the presence of an EAD is confirmed or otherwise determined, the CVO will direct that the operational phase be implemented.

Under the EADRA, the CVO must notify the chair of the CCEAD within 24 hours.
The key actions to be carried out by the CVO early in the operational phase (unless already completed) are as follows:

- Activate SCC(s) and LCC(s).
- Confirm with the SCC Coordinator and LCC Controller which centre will have responsibility for managing operational activities outside the restricted area.
- Advise the relevant minister’s office and the department’s executive management.
- Arrange all necessary legislative matters to initiate the EAD response, including
  - proclamations to declare the existence of the EAD in the jurisdiction
  - implementation of a stock standstill for restricted areas and/or control areas, as appropriate
  - funding arrangements through the treasury department.
- Approve the EADRP and submit it to the CCEAD.
- Delegate responsibility for the management of normal animal health programs in nonaffected areas of the state or territory.
- Conduct ongoing activities as detailed in the CVO role description (CVO PO 01) in Part 2 of the Control Centres Management Manual.

**Stand-down phase**

The CVO should consult with the SCC Coordinator to ensure that all personnel who worked on the EAD response are debriefed. Participants in the debriefing should include senior departmental managers and LCC personnel.
Appendix 5: Checklist for SCC Coordinator

Investigation and alert phase

The Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) may appoint a State Coordination Centre (SCC) Coordinator in the investigation and alert phase. Appointing the SCC Coordinator at this early stage means that the SCC Coordinator is fully informed and may assist with rapid activation of the SCC should the incident proceed to the operational phase.

Activities of the SCC Coordinator in the investigation and alert phase may be as follows:

• Activate management personnel for the SCC and, where required, seek their assistance to complete the tasks below.
• Advise stakeholders in affected areas of the suspected emergency animal disease (EAD) incident if the senior government veterinary officer has not done so (see Appendix 3).
• Analyse and evaluate the information collected by the government veterinary officer in the approved electronic information management system.
• Begin preparing an initial report for submission by the CVO to the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases, and begin development of an EAD Response Plan.
• Develop proposals for personnel and other resource requirements for Local Control Centre (LCC) operations.
• After consultation with the CVO, consider the boundaries of any restricted areas (RAs) or control areas (CAs) that may need to be proclaimed if the EAD is confirmed, and prepare proformas for proclamation of these areas, in conjunction with the department’s senior legal officer.
• Investigate the status of urgent tracings and ensure that they are investigated appropriately.
• Consider the need for imposition of a standstill order.
• As required, help the LCC Controller (if appointed at this time) and state or territory emergency services to select a suitable site for the LCC.

Operational phase

Activities of the SCC Coordinator early in the operational phase are as follows:

• Activate the state or territory emergency management arrangements, and ask other agencies to appoint liaison personnel.
• Notify all stakeholders that the incident is in the operational phase.
• Expand the management of the SCC and appoint personnel to key functions.
• Instruct the LCC Controller to establish the LCC and take charge of operations in the RA (and operational activities outside the RA, if this is the decision of the CVO).
• Advise key departmental staff of the EAD situation; the controls and restrictions on animals, animal products and animal-related movements; and the potential need to provide staff to the LCC and SCC.
• Ensure that media releases are prepared, including technical information, and initiate press conferences (see the Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual[27]). In some cases, joint state/territory and Australian Government press releases may need to be issued.

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• Brief the SCC Coordination Management Team on (note that this is not an exhaustive list):
  - the nature of the EAD that has been declared; inform them that AUSVETPLAN is in the operational phase
  - the location of the infected premises
  - the locations, telephone numbers, fax numbers and email addresses of the LCC and SCC
  - the boundaries of the RA and CA, and conditions that apply in these areas
  - the need for departmental officers not involved in disease control activities to cease further visits to properties with susceptible species in the RA (depending on the specific threat)
  - the need for urgent property visits in the CA to be subject to full decontamination procedures on entering and leaving properties (depending on the specific threat)
  - the need to report suspicions of disease and provide information as required
  - any actions required of them (refer to Management descriptions in Part 2 of the Control Centres Management Manual)
  - the names of media contacts and key spokespersons.

• Arrange for the appointment (gazettal) of interstate and other appropriate personnel as inspectors under the relevant legislation.

• Oversee the implementation of a standstill order, if required.

• Conduct ongoing activities as detailed in the SCC Coordinator description (SCC IM 01) in Part 2 of the Control Centres Management Manual.

Stand-down phase

Activities of the SCC Coordinator in the stand-down phase are as follows:

• Close the SCC. As operations wind down, the SCC will require fewer staff and will eventually be stood down on the direction of the CVO.

• Ensure that all records relating to the EAD response are held securely so that they are available for retrieval.

• After consultation with the CVO, arrange for a debriefing of all personnel who worked in the SCC. Depending on the scale of the response, the debriefing may also include senior departmental managers and/or LCC operational personnel.
Appendix 6: Checklist for LCC Controller

Investigation and alert phase

The Local Control Centre (LCC) Controller may be appointed and activated by the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) in the investigation and alert phase.

The LCC Controller identifies likely LCC sites and determines personnel requirements. Personnel are put on stand-by, and the LCC is scaled up to a level commensurate with suspicion of an emergency animal disease (EAD).

Operational phase

Early in the operational phase, the LCC Controller should do the following:

- Coordinate the establishment of an LCC (see NASOP 02 — Selecting an LCC Location)
- Ensure that an Incident Action Plan (IAP) is developed for field operations — both short term (one shift) and longer term (eg one week).
- Ensure that the following people and agencies within the restricted area (RA) are informed of the details of the IAP, and of a time and place for an initial briefing
  - local departmental managers
  - local government (mayors, shire secretaries)
  - police (emergency management) coordinator for the district or region
  - regional emergency services officer (who should also be given a preliminary list of resources required)
  - appropriate industry contacts.
- Ensure that private veterinary practitioners, district departmental staff and other key industry contacts in the affected area are advised of the following (note that this is not an exhaustive list):
  - that AUSVETPLAN is in the operational phase
  - the nature of the disease that has been confirmed
  - the location of the infected premises (IP)
  - the boundaries of the RA and control area (CA), and conditions that apply in these areas
  - details of stock standstill arrangements
  - the location, telephone number, fax number and email address of the LCC
  - that no visits are to be made to properties with susceptible species within the RA unless a written permit has been issued by the LCC Movement Controls — Permits function (see Part 2 of the Control Centres Management Manual — CCMM, LCC OP 03.1).
  - that any suspicion of disease must be reported immediately to the LCC, and the person reporting must remain on the premises until the LCC Controller, Operations Management (CCMM Part 2, LCC OP 01) or head of the Investigations function (CCMM Part 2, LCC OP 02) gives them permission to leave
  - contacts for all media enquiries.
- Confirm the following particulars with the SCC
  - the declaration of the RA and CA, and the conditions, including stock standstill arrangements, that apply in these areas
  - the locations, telephone numbers, fax numbers and email addresses of the LCC and SCC
  - resource requirements and supply (personnel and equipment)
  - any urgent tracings on or off the IP that need to be referred to the SCC.
• Conduct ongoing activities as detailed in the LCC Controller description (LCC IM 01) in Part 2 of the CCMM.

Stand-down phase

Activities of the LCC Controller in the stand-down phase are as follows:

• Close the LCC. As operations wind down, the LCC will require fewer personnel and will eventually be stood down on the direction of the CVO.
• Ensure that all records relating to the EAD response are held securely so that they are available for retrieval.
• After consultation with the CVO, arrange for a debriefing of all personnel who worked in the LCC. Depending on the scale of the response, the debriefing may also include senior departmental managers and/or SCC Operations personnel.
# Glossary

## Standard AUSVETPLAN terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Animal byproducts</td>
<td>Products of animal origin that are not for consumption but are destined for industrial use (eg hides and skins, fur, wool, hair, feathers, hooves, bones, fertiliser).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Health Committee</td>
<td>A committee whose members are the Australian and state and territory CVOs, the Director of the CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory, and the Director of Environmental Biosecurity in the Australian Government Department of the Environment. The committee provides advice to the National Biosecurity Committee on animal health matters, focusing on technical issues and regulatory policy (formerly called the Veterinary Committee). <em>See also National Biosecurity Committee</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal products</td>
<td>Meat, meat products and other products of animal origin (eg eggs, milk) for human consumption or for use in animal feedstuff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved processing facility (APF)</td>
<td>An abattoir, knackery, milk processing plant or other such facility that maintains increased biosecurity standards. Such a facility could have animals or animal products introduced from lower risk premises under a permit for processing to an approved standard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-risk premises (ARP)</td>
<td>A premises in a restricted area that contains a live susceptible animal(s) but is not considered at the time of classification to be an infected premises, dangerous contact premises, dangerous contact processing facility, suspect premises or trace premises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Chief Veterinary Officer</td>
<td>The nominated senior veterinarian in the Australian Government Department of Agriculture and Water Resources who manages international animal health commitments and the Australian Government’s response to an animal disease outbreak. <em>See also Chief veterinary officer</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSVETPLAN</td>
<td>Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan. A series of technical response plans that describe the proposed Australian approach to an emergency animal disease incident. The documents provide guidance based on sound analysis, linking policy, strategies, implementation, coordination and emergency-management plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief veterinary officer (CVO)</td>
<td>The senior veterinarian of the animal health authority in each jurisdiction (national, state or territory) who has responsibility for animal disease control in that jurisdiction. <em>See also Australian Chief Veterinary Officer</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compartamentalisation</td>
<td>The process of defining, implementing and maintaining one or more disease-free establishments under a common biosecurity management system in accordance with OIE guidelines, based on applied biosecurity measures and surveillance, in order to facilitate disease control and/or trade.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>The sum of money paid by government to an owner for livestock or property that are destroyed for the purpose of eradication or prevention of the spread of an emergency animal disease, and livestock that have died of the emergency animal disease. See also Cost-sharing arrangements, Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD)</td>
<td>The key technical coordinating body for animal health emergencies. Members are state and territory CVOs, representatives of CSIRO-AAHL and the relevant industries, and the Australian CVO as chair.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control area (CA)</td>
<td>A legally declared area where the disease controls, including surveillance and movement controls, applied are of lesser intensity than those in a restricted area (the limits of a control area and the conditions applying to it can be varied during an incident according to need).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost-sharing arrangements</td>
<td>Arrangements agreed between governments (national and states/territories) and livestock industries for sharing the costs of emergency animal disease responses. See also Compensation, Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous contact animal</td>
<td>A susceptible animal that has been designated as being exposed to other infected animals or potentially infectious products following tracing and epidemiological investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous contact premises (DCP)</td>
<td>A premises, apart from an abattoir, knackery or milk processing plant (or other such facility), that, after investigation and based on a risk assessment, is considered to contain a susceptible animal(s) not showing clinical signs, but considered highly likely to contain an infected animal(s) and/or contaminated animal products, wastes or things that present an unacceptable risk to the response if the risk is not addressed, and that therefore requires action to address the risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous contact processing facility (DCPF)</td>
<td>An abattoir, knackery, milk processing plant or other such facility that, based on a risk assessment, appears highly likely to have received infected animals, or contaminated animal products, wastes or things, and that requires action to address the risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declared area</td>
<td>A defined tract of land that is subjected to disease control restrictions under emergency animal disease legislation. There are two types of declared areas: restricted area and control area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decontamination</td>
<td>Includes all stages of cleaning and disinfection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depopulation</td>
<td>The removal of a host population from a particular area to control or prevent the spread of disease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroy (animals)</td>
<td>To kill animals humanely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease agent</td>
<td>A general term for a transmissible organism or other factor that causes an infectious disease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease Watch Hotline</td>
<td>24-hour freecall service for reporting suspected incidences of exotic diseases — 1800 675 888.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinfectant</td>
<td>A chemical used to destroy disease agents outside a living animal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disinfection</td>
<td>The application, after thorough cleansing, of procedures intended to destroy the infectious or parasitic agents of animal diseases, including zoonoses; applies to premises, vehicles and different objects that may have been directly or indirectly contaminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinsectisation</td>
<td>The destruction of insect pests, usually with a chemical agent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposal</td>
<td>Sanitary removal of animal carcasses, animal products, materials and wastes by burial, burning or some other process so as to prevent the spread of disease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency animal disease</td>
<td>A disease that is (a) exotic to Australia or (b) a variant of an endemic disease or (c) a serious infectious disease of unknown or uncertain cause or (d) a severe outbreak of a known endemic disease, and that is considered to be of national significance with serious social or trade implications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement</td>
<td>Agreement between the Australian and state/territory governments and livestock industries on the management of emergency animal disease responses. Provisions include participatory decision making, risk management, cost sharing, the use of appropriately trained personnel and existing standards such as AUSVETPLAN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endemic animal disease</td>
<td>A disease affecting animals (which may include humans) that is known to occur in Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise</td>
<td>See Risk enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)</td>
<td>A serological test designed to detect and measure the presence of antibody or antigen in a sample. The test uses an enzyme reaction with a substrate to produce a colour change when antigen–antibody binding occurs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epidemiological investigation</td>
<td>An investigation to identify and qualify the risk factors associated with the disease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epidemiology</td>
<td>The study of disease in populations and of factors that determine its occurrence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exotic animal disease</td>
<td>A disease affecting animals (which may include humans) that does not normally occur in Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exotic fauna/feral animals</td>
<td>See Wild animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fomites</td>
<td>Inanimate objects (eg boots, clothing, equipment, instruments, vehicles, crates, packaging) that can carry an infectious disease agent and may spread the disease through mechanical transmission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
General permit
A legal document that describes the requirements for movement of an animal (or group of animals), commodity or thing, for which permission may be granted without the need for direct interaction between the person moving the animal(s), commodity or thing and a government veterinarian or inspector. The permit may be completed via a webpage or in an approved place (such as a government office or commercial premises). A printed version of the permit must accompany the movement. The permit may impose preconditions and/or restrictions on movements. See also Special permit

In-contact animals
Animals that have had close contact with infected animals, such as noninfected animals in the same group as infected animals.

Incubation period
The period that elapses between the introduction of the pathogen into the animal and the first clinical signs of the disease.

Index case
The first case of the disease to be diagnosed in a disease outbreak. See also Index property

Index property
The property on which the index case is found. See also Index case

Infected premises (IP)
A defined area (which may be all or part of a property) on which animals meeting the case definition are or were present, or the causative agent of the emergency animal disease is present, or there is a reasonable suspicion that either is present, and that the relevant chief veterinary officer or their delegate has declared to be an infected premises.

Local control centre (LCC)
An emergency operations centre responsible for the command and control of field operations in a defined area.

Monitoring
Routine collection of data for assessing the health status of a population or the level of contamination of a site for remediation purposes. See also Surveillance

Movement control
Restrictions placed on the movement of animals, people and other things to prevent the spread of disease.

National Biosecurity Committee (NBC)
The NBC was formally established under the Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB). The IGAB was signed on 13 January 2012, and signatories include all states and territories except Tasmania. The NBC provides advice to the Agriculture Senior Officials Committee and the Agriculture Ministers’ Forum on national biosecurity issues, and on the IGAB.

National management group (NMG)
A group established to approve (or not approve) the invoking of cost sharing under the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement. NMG members are the Secretary of the Australian Government Department of Agriculture and Water Resources as chair, the chief executive officers of the state and territory government parties, and the president (or analogous officer) of each of the relevant industry parties.

Native wildlife See Wild animals
OIE Terrestrial Code


OIE Terrestrial Manual


Operational procedures

Detailed instructions for carrying out specific disease control activities, such as disposal, destruction, decontamination and valuation.

Outside area (OA)

The area of Australia outside the declared (control and restricted) areas.

Owner

Person responsible for a premises (includes an agent of the owner, such as a manager or other controlling officer).

Polymerase chain reaction (PCR)

A method of amplifying and analysing DNA sequences that can be used to detect the presence of viral DNA.

Premises

A tract of land including its buildings, or a separate farm or facility that is maintained by a single set of services and personnel.

Premises of relevance (POR)

A premises in a control area that contains a live susceptible animal(s) but is considered at the time of classification not to be an infected premises, suspect premises, trace premises, dangerous contact premises or dangerous contact processing facility.

Prevalence

The proportion (or percentage) of animals in a particular population affected by a particular disease (or infection or positive antibody titre) at a given point in time.

Primary case

The first actual case of the disease.

Quarantine

Legal restrictions imposed on a place or a tract of land by the serving of a notice limiting access or egress of specified animals, persons or things.

Resolved premises (RP)

An infected premises, dangerous contact premises or dangerous contact processing facility that has completed the required control measures and is subject to the procedures and restrictions appropriate to the area in which it is located.

Restricted area (RA)

A relatively small legally declared area around infected premises and dangerous contact premises that is subject to disease controls, including intense surveillance and movement controls.

Risk enterprise

A defined livestock or related enterprise that is potentially a major source of infection for many other premises. Includes intensive piggeries, feedlots, abattoirs, knackeries, saleyards, calf scales, milk factories, tanneries, skin sheds, game meat establishments, cold stores, artificial insemination centres, veterinary laboratories and hospitals, road and rail freight depots, showgrounds, field days, weighbridges, garbage depots.
Sensitivity: The proportion of truly positive units that are correctly identified as positive by a test.  
*See also* Specificity

Sentinel animal: Animal of known health status that is monitored to detect the presence of a specific disease agent.

Seroconversion: The appearance in the blood serum of antibodies (as determined by a serology test) following vaccination or natural exposure to a disease agent.

Serosurveillance: Surveillance of an animal population by testing serum samples for the presence of antibodies to disease agents.

Serotype: A subgroup of microorganisms identified by the antigens carried (as determined by a serology test).

Serum neutralisation test: A serological test to detect and measure the presence of antibody in a sample. Antibody in serum is serially diluted to detect the highest dilution that neutralises a standard amount of antigen. The neutralising antibody titre is given as the reciprocal of this dilution.

Slaughter: The humane killing of an animal for meat for human consumption.

Special permit: A legal document that describes the requirements for movement of an animal (or group of animals), commodity or thing, for which the person moving the animal(s), commodity or thing must obtain prior written permission from the relevant government veterinarian or inspector. A printed version of the permit must accompany the movement. The permit may impose preconditions and/or restrictions on movements.  
*See also* General permit

Specificity: The proportion of truly negative units that are correctly identified as negative by a test.  
*See also* Sensitivity

Stamping out: The strategy of eliminating infection from premises through the destruction of animals in accordance with the particular AUSVETPLAN manual, and in a manner that permits appropriate disposal of carcasses and decontamination of the site.

State coordination centre (SCC): The emergency operations centre that directs the disease control operations to be undertaken in that state or territory.

Surveillance: A systematic program of investigation designed to establish the presence, extent or absence of a disease, or of infection or contamination with the causative organism. It includes the examination of animals for clinical signs, antibodies or the causative organism.

Susceptible animals: Animals that can be infected with a particular disease.

Suspect animal: An animal that may have been exposed to an emergency disease such that its quarantine and intensive surveillance, but not pre-emptive slaughter, is warranted.  
*or*  
An animal not known to have been exposed to a disease agent but showing clinical signs requiring differential diagnosis.
Suspect premises (SP)  Temporary classification of a premises that contains a susceptible animal(s) not known to have been exposed to the disease agent but showing clinical signs similar to the case definition, and that therefore requires investigation(s).

Swill  Also known as ‘prohibited pig feed’, material of mammalian origin, or any substance that has come in contact with this material; it does not include:

- milk, milk products or milk byproducts, either of Australian provenance or legally imported for stockfeed use into Australia
- material containing flesh, bones, blood, offal or mammal carcases that is treated by an approved process28
- a carcass or part of a domestic pig, born and raised on the property on which the pig or pigs that are administered the part are held, that is administered for therapeutic purposes in accordance with the written instructions of a veterinary practitioner
- material used under an individual and defined-period permit issued by a jurisdiction for the purposes of research or baiting.

This definition was endorsed by the Agricultural Ministers’ Council through AGMIN OOS 04/2014.

Swill feeding  Also known as ‘feeding prohibited pig feed’, includes:

- feeding, or allowing or directing another person to feed, prohibited pig feed to a pig
- allowing a pig to have access to prohibited pig feed
- the collection and storage or possession of prohibited pig feed on a premises where one or more pigs are kept
- supplying to another person prohibited pig feed that the supplier knows is for feeding to any pig.

This definition was endorsed by the Agricultural Ministers’ Council through AGMIN OOS 04/2014.

Trace premises (TP)  Temporary classification of a premises that contains susceptible animal(s) that tracing indicates may have been exposed to the disease agent, or contains contaminated animal products, wastes or things, and that requires investigation(s).

Tracing  The process of locating animals, persons or other items that may be implicated in the spread of disease, so that appropriate action can be taken.

Unknown status premises (UP)  A premises within a declared area where the current presence of susceptible animals and/or risk products, wastes or things is unknown.

Vaccination  Inoculation of individuals with a vaccine to provide active immunity.

28 Refer to jurisdictional legislation for approved processes. Jurisdictions may have approved processes that meet the following minimum standards: rendering in accordance with the Australian Standard for the Hygienic Rendering of Animal Products; under jurisdictional permit, cooking processes subject to compliance verification that ensure that an internal temperature of at least 70 °C for a minimum of 30 minutes, or equivalent, has been reached; treatment of cooking oil that has been used for cooking in Australia in accordance with the National Standard for Recycling of Used Cooking Fats and Oils Intended for Animal Feeds; under jurisdictional permit, any other nationally agreed process approved by the Animal Health Committee for which an acceptable risk assessment has been undertaken and that is subject to compliance verification.
Vaccine
A substance used to stimulate immunity against one or several disease-causing agents to provide protection or to reduce the effects of the disease. A vaccine is prepared from the causative agent of a disease, its products, or a synthetic substitute, which is treated to act as an antigen without inducing the disease.

– adjuvanted
A vaccine in which one or several disease-causing agents are combined with an adjuvant (a substance that increases the immune response).

– attenuated
A vaccine prepared from infective or 'live' microbes that are less pathogenic but retain their ability to induce protective immunity.

– gene deleted
An attenuated or inactivated vaccine in which genes for non-essential surface glycoproteins have been removed by genetic engineering. This provides a useful immunological marker for the vaccine virus compared with the wild virus.

– inactivated
A vaccine prepared from a virus that has been inactivated ('killed') by chemical or physical treatment.

– recombinant
A vaccine produced from virus that has been genetically engineered to contain only selected genes, including those causing the immunogenic effect.

Vector
A living organism (frequently an arthropod) that transmits an infectious agent from one host to another. A biological vector is one in which the infectious agent must develop or multiply before becoming infective to a recipient host. A mechanical vector is one that transmits an infectious agent from one host to another but is not essential to the life cycle of the agent.

Veterinary investigation
An investigation of the diagnosis, pathology and epidemiology of the disease.
See also Epidemiological investigation

Viraemia
The presence of viruses in the blood.

Wild animals

– native wildlife
Animals that are indigenous to Australia and may be susceptible to emergency animal diseases (eg bats, dingoes, marsupials).

– feral animals
Animals of domestic species that are not confined or under control (eg cats, horses, pigs).

– exotic fauna
Nondomestic animal species that are not indigenous to Australia (eg foxes).

Zero susceptible species premises (ZP)
A premises that does not contain any susceptible animals or risk products, wastes or things.

Zoning
The process of defining, implementing and maintaining a disease-free or infected area in accordance with OIE guidelines, based on geopolitical and/or physical boundaries and surveillance, in order to facilitate disease control and/or trade.

Zoonosis
A disease of animals that can be transmitted to humans.
Abbreviations

Specific abbreviations

ACVO Australian Chief Veterinary Officer
AIIMS Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System
BIMS Biosecurity Incident Management System
CCMM AUSVETPLAN Control Centres Management Manual
CMT Coordination Management Team
DA Australian Government Department of Agriculture
EADRP Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan
FCP Forward Command Post
FMD foot-and-mouth disease
GIS geographic information system
GVO government veterinary officer
IAHER International Animal Health Emergency Reserve
IMT Incident Management Team
NCC National Coordination Centre
SGVO senior government veterinary officer

Standard AUSVETPLAN abbreviations

AAHL Australian Animal Health Laboratory
AN assessed negative
APF approved processing facility
ARP at-risk premises
AUSVETPLAN Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan
CA control area
CCEAD Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
CVO chief veterinary officer
DCP dangerous contact premises
DCPF dangerous contact processing facility
EAD emergency animal disease
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EADRA</td>
<td>Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>EADRP</td>
<td>Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDTA</td>
<td>ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (anticoagulant for whole blood)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELISA</td>
<td>enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay</td>
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<td>GP</td>
<td>general permit</td>
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<td>IETS</td>
<td>International Embryo Transfer Society</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>infected premises</td>
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<td>LCC</td>
<td>local control centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NASOP</td>
<td>nationally agreed standard operating procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMG</td>
<td>National Management Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>outside area</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIE</td>
<td>World Organisation for Animal Health</td>
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<td>PCR</td>
<td>polymerase chain reaction</td>
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<td>premises of relevance</td>
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<td>state coordination centre</td>
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<td>special permit</td>
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